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y rail from Nashville as equitably as possible。 We also agreed on some subordinate changes in the organization of the three separate armies which were destined to take the field； among which was the consolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps （Howard and Slocum） into a single corps； to be commanded by General Jos。 Hooker。 General Howard was to be transferred to the Fourth Corps； vice Gordon Granger to avail himself of his leave of absence； and General Slocum was to be ordered down the Mississippi River； to command the District of Vicksburg。 These changes required the consent of the President； and were all in due time approved。
The great question of the campaign was one of supplies。 Nashville； our chief depot； was itself partially in a hostile country； and even the routes of supply from Louisville to Nashville by rail； and by way of the Cumberland River； had to be guarded。 Chattanooga （our starting…point） was one hundred and thirty…six miles in front of Nashville； and every foot of the way； especially the many bridges； trestles； and culverts； had to be strongly guarded against the acts of a local hostile population and of the enemy's cavalry。 Then； of course； as we advanced into Georgia； it was manifest that we should have to repair the railroad； use it； and guard it like… wise： General Thomas's army was much the largest of the three； was best provided； and contained the best corps of engineers； railroad managers； and repair parties； as well as the best body of spies and provost…marshals。 On him we were therefore compelled in a great measure to rely for these most useful branches of service。 He had so long exercised absolute command and control over the railroads in his department； that the other armies were jealous； and these thought the Army of the Cumberland got the lion's share of the supplies and other advantages of the railroads。 I found a good deal of feeling in the Army of the Tennessee on this score； and therefore took supreme control of the roads myself； placed all the army commanders on an equal footing； and gave to each the same control； so far as orders of transportation for men and stores were concerned。 Thomas's spies brought him frequent and accurate reports of Jos。 E。 Johnston's army at Dalton； giving its strength anywhere between forty and fifty thousand men； and these were being reenforced by troops from Mississippi； and by the Georgia militia； under General G。 W。 Smith。 General Johnston seemed to be acting purely on the defensive； so that we had time and leisure to take all our measures deliberately and fully。 I fixed the date of May 1st； when all things should be in readiness for the grand forward movement； and then returned to Nashville； General Schofield going back to Knoxville； and McPherson to Huntsville； Thomas remaining at Chattanooga。
On the 2d of April； at Nashville； I wrote to General Grant； then at Washington； reporting to him the results of my visit to the several armies； and asked his consent to the several changes proposed； which was promptly given by telegraph。 I then addressed myself specially to the troublesome question of transportation and supplies。 I found the capacity of the railroads from Nashville forward to Decatur； and to Chattanooga； so small； especially in the number of locomotives and care； that it was clear that they were barely able to supply the daily wants of the armies then dependent on them； with no power of accumulating a surplus in advance。 The cars were daily loaded down with men returning from furlough； with cattle； horses； etc。； and； by reason of the previous desolation of the country between Chattanooga and Knoxville； General Thomas had authorized the issue of provisions to the suffering inhabitants。
We could not attempt an advance into Georgia without food； ammunition； etc。； and ordinary prudence dictated that we should have an accumulation at the front； in case of interruption to the railway by the act of the enemy； or by common accident。 Accordingly； on the 6th of April； I issued a general order； limiting the use of the railroad…cars to transporting only the essential articles of food； ammunition； and supplies for the army proper； forbidding any further issues to citizens； and cutting off all civil traffic； requiring the commanders of posts within thirty miles of Nashville to haul out their own stores in wagons； requiring all troops destined for the front to march； and all beef… cattle to be driven on their own legs。 This was a great help； but of course it naturally raised a howl。 Some of the poor Union people of East Tennessee appealed to President Lincoln； whose kind heart responded promptly to their requeSt。 He telegraphed me to know if I could not modify or repeal my orders； but I answered him that a great campaign was impending； on which the fate of the nation hung； that our railroads had but a limited capacity； and could not provide for the necessities of the army and of the people too； that one or the other must quit； and we could not until the army of Jos。 Johnston was conquered； etc。； etc。 Mr。 Lincoln seemed to acquiesce； and I advised the people to obtain and drive out cattle from Kentucky； and to haul out their supplies by the wagon… road from the same quarter； by way of Cumberland Gap。 By these changes we nearly or quite doubled our daily accumulation of stores at the front； and yet even this was not found enough。
I accordingly called together in Nashville the master of transportation； Colonel Anderson； the chief quartermaster； General J。 L。 Donaldson； and the chief commissary； General Amos Beckwith； for conference。 I assumed the strength of the army to move from Chattanooga into Georgia at one hundred thousand men； and the number of animals to be fed； both for cavalry and draught； at thirty…five thousand； then； allowing for occasional wrecks of trains； which were very common； and for the interruption of the road itself by guerrillas and regular raids； we estimated it would require one hundred and thirty cars； of ten tons each； to reach Chattanooga daily； to be reasonably certain of an adequate supply。 Even with this calculation； we could not afford to bring forward hay for the horses and mules； nor more than five pounds of oats or corn per day for each animal。 I was willing to risk the question of forage in part； because I expected to find wheat and corn fields； and a good deal of grass； as we advanced into Georgia at that season of the year。 The problem then was to deliver at Chattanooga and beyond one hundred and thirty car…loads daily； leaving the beef…cattle to be driven on the hoof； and all the troops in excess of the usual train…guards to march by the ordinary roads。 Colonel Anderson promptly explained that he did not possess cars or locomotives enough to do this work。 I then instructed and authorized him to hold on to all trains that arrived at Nashville from Louisville； and to allow none to go back until he had secured enough to fill the requirements of our problem。 At the time he only had about sixty serviceable locomotives； and about six hundred cars of all kinds； and he represented that to provide for all contingencies he must have at least one hundred locomotives and one thousand cars。 As soon as Mr。 Guthr