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exactness。 Something of this too may arise from want of words in the
language to express the more nice discriminations which a deep
investigation discovers。 A great deal； however； of this difference
vanishes when each opinion is tolerably explained and understood by
constancy and precision in the use of terms。
We apply the term taste to that act of the mind by which we like or
dislike； whatever be the subject。 Our judgment upon an airy nothing； a
fancy which has no foundation； is called by the same name which we give
to our determination concerning those truths which refer to the most
general and most unalterable principles of human nature； to works which
are only to be produced by the greatest efforts of the human understanding。
However inconvenient this may be； we are obliged to take words as we
find them； all we can do is to distinguish the things to which they are
applied。
We may let pass those things which are at once subjects of taste and
sense； and which having as much certainty as the senses themselves； give
no occasion to inquiry or dispute。 The natural appetite or taste of the
human mind is for truth； whether that truth results from the real agreement
or equality of original ideas among themselves； from the agreement of the
representation of any object with the thing represented； or from the
correspondence of the several parts of any arrangement with each other。
It is the very same taste which relishes a demonstration in geometry； that is
pleased with the resemblance of a picture to an original； and touched with
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SEVEN DISCOURSES ON ART
the harmony of music。
All these have unalterable and fixed foundations in nature； and are
therefore equally investigated by reason； and known by study； some with
more； some with less clearness； but all exactly in the same way。 A
picture that is unlike； is false。 Disproportionate ordinance of parts is not
right because it cannot be true until it ceases to be a contradiction to assert
that the parts have no relation to the whole。 Colouring is true where it is
naturally adapted to the eye； from brightness； from softness； from
harmony； from resemblance； because these agree with their object； nature；
and therefore are true： as true as mathematical demonstration； but known
to be true only to those who study these things。
But besides real； there is also apparent truth； or opinion； or prejudice。
With regard to real truth； when it is known； the taste which conforms to it
is； and must be； uniform。 With regard to the second sort of truth； which
may be called truth upon sufferance； or truth by courtesy； it is not fixed；
but variable。 However； whilst these opinions and prejudices on which it
is founded continue； they operate as truth； and the art； whose office it is to
please the mind； as well as instruct it； must direct itself according to
opinion； or it will not attain its end。
In proportion as these prejudices are known to be generally diffused；
or long received； the taste which conforms to them approaches nearer to
certainty； and to a sort of resemblance to real science； even where opinions
are found to be no better than prejudices。 And since they deserve； on
account of their duration and extent； to be considered as really true； they
become capable of no small decree of stability and determination by their
permanent and uniform nature。
As these prejudices become more narrow； more local； more transitory；
this secondary taste becomes more and more fantastical； recedes from real
science； is less to be approved by reason； and less followed in practice；
though in no case perhaps to be wholly neglected； where it does not stand；
as it sometimes does； in direct defiance of the most respectable opinions
received amongst mankind。
Having laid down these positions； I shall proceed with less method；
because less will serve； to explain and apply them。
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SEVEN DISCOURSES ON ART
We will take it for granted that reason is something invariable and
fixed in the nature of things； and without endeavouring to go back to an
account of first principles； which for ever will elude our search； we will
conclude that whatever goes under the name of taste； which we can fairly
bring under the dominion of reason； must be considered as equally exempt
from change。 If therefore； in the course of this inquiry； we can show that
there are rules for the conduct of the artist which are fixed and invariable；
it implies； of course； that the art of the connoisseur； or； in other words；
taste； has likewise invariable principles。
Of the judgment which we make on the works of art； and the
preference that we give to one class of art over another； if a reason be
demanded； the question is perhaps evaded by answering； 〃I judge from my
taste〃； but it does not follow that a better answer cannot be given； though
for common gazers this may be sufficient。 Every man is not obliged to
investigate the causes of his approbation or dislike。
The arts would lie open for ever to caprice and casualty； if those who
are to judge of their excellences had no settled principles by which they
are to regulate their decisions； and the merit or defect of performances
were to be determined by unguided fancy。 And indeed we may venture
to assert that whatever speculative knowledge is necessary to the artist； is
equally and indispensably necessary to the connoisseur。
The first idea that occurs in the consideration of what is fixed in art； or
in taste； is that presiding principle of which I have so frequently spoken in
former discourses； the general idea of nature。 The beginning； the middle；
and the end of everything that is valuable in taste； is comprised in the
knowledge of what is truly nature； for whatever ideas are not conformable
to those of nature； or universal opinion； must be considered as more or less
capricious。
The idea of nature comprehending not only the forms which nature
produces； but also the nature and internal fabric and organisation； as I may
call it； of the human mind and imaginati