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t on the statement of a special jury； as in the time of Lord Mansfield and his successors； or upon the finding of a common jury based on the testimony of witnesses； as is the practice to…day in this country。 But many instances will be found the text…books which show that； when the facts are ascertained； they soon cease to be referred to； and give place to a rule of law。
＇152＇ The same transition is noticeable with regard to the teachings of experience。 There are many cases； no doubt； in which the court would lean for aid upon a jury； but there are also many in which the teaching has been formulated in specific rules。 These rules will be found to vary considerably with regard to the number of concomitant circumstances necessary to throw the peril of conduct otherwise indifferent on the actor。 As the circumstances become more numerous and complex； the tendency to cut the knot with the jury becomes greater。 It will be useful to follow a line of cases up from the simple to the more complicated； by way of illustration。 The difficulty of distinguishing rules based on other grounds of policy from those which have been worked out in the field of negligence； will be particularly noticed。
In all these cases it will be found that there has been a voluntary act on the part of the person to be charged。 The reason for this requirement was shown in the foregoing Lecture。 Unnecessary though it is for the defendant to have intended or foreseen the evil which he has caused； it is necessary that he should have chosen the conduct which led to it。 But it has also been shown that a voluntary act is not enough； and that even a co…ordinated series of acts or conduct is often not enough by itself。 But the co…ordination of a series of acts shows a further intent than is necessarily manifested by any single act； and sometimes proves with almost equal certainty the knowledge of one or more concomitant circumstances。 And there are cases where conduct with only the intent and knowledge thus necessarily implied is sufficient to throw the risk of it on the actor。
For instance； when a man does the series of acts called ＇153＇ walking； it is assumed for all purposes of responsibility that he knows the earth is under his feet。 The conduct per se is indifferent； to be sure。 A man may go through the motions of walking without legal peril； if he chooses to practise on a private treadmill； but if he goes through the same motions on the surface of the earth； it cannot be doubted that he knows that the earth is there。 With that knowledge； he acts at his peril in certain respects。 If he crosses his neighbor's boundary； he is a trespasser。 The reasons for this strict rule have been partially discussed in the last Lecture。 Possibly there is more of history or of past or present notions of policy its explanation than is there suggested； and at any rate I do not care to justify the rule。 But it is intelligible。 A man who walks knows that he is moving over the surface of the earth； he knows that he is surrounded by private estates which he has no right to enter； and he knows that his motion； unless properly guided； will carry him into those estates。 He is thus warned； and the burden of his conduct is thrown upon himself。
But the act of walking does not throw the peril of all possible consequences upon him。 He may run a man down in the street； but he is not liable for that unless he does it negligently。 Confused as the law is with cross…lights of tradition； and hard as we may find it to arrive at perfectly satisfactory general theory； it does distinguish in a pretty sensible way； according to the nature and degree of the different perils incident to a given situation。
》From the simple case of walking we may proceed to the more complex cases of dealings with tangible objects of property。 It may be said that； generally speaking； a man meddles with such things at his own risk。 It does not ＇154＇ matter how honestly he may believe that they belong to himself； or are free to the public； or that he has a license from the owner； or that the case is one in which the law has limited the rights of ownership； he takes the chance of how the fact may turn out； and if the fact is otherwise than as he supposes； he must answer for his conduct。 As has been already suggested； he knows that he is exercising more or less dominion over property； or that he is injuring it； he must make good his right if it is challenged。
Whether this strict rule is based on the common grounds of liability； or upon some special consideration of past or present policy； policy has set some limits to it； as was mentioned in the foregoing Lecture。
Another case of conduct which is at the risk of the party without further knowledge than it necessarily imports； is the keeping of a tiger or bear； or other animal of a species commonly known to be ferocious。 If such an animal escapes and does damage； the owner is liable simply on proof that he kept it。 In this instance the comparative remoteness of the moment of choice in the line of causation from the effect complained of； will be particularly noticed。 Ordinary cases of liability arise out of a choice which was the proximate cause of the harm upon which the action is founded。 But here there is usually no question of negligence in guarding the beast。 It is enough in most； if not in all cases； that the owner has chosen to keep it。 Experience has shown that tigers and bears are alert to find means of escape； and that； if they escape； they are very certain to do harm of a serious nature。 The possibility of a great danger has the same effect as the probability of a less one； and the law throws the risk of ＇155＇ the venture on the person who introduces the peril into the community。
This remoteness of the opportunity of choice goes far to show that this risk is thrown upon the owner for other reasons than the ordinary one of imprudent conduct。 It has been suggested that the liability stood upon remote inadvertence。 /1/ But the law does not forbid a man to keep a menagerie； or deem it in any way blameworthy。 It has applied nearly as strict a rule to dealings which are even more clearly beneficial to the community than a show of wild beasts。
This seems to be one of those cases where the ground of liability is to be sought in policy coupled with tradition； rather than in any form of blameworthiness； or the existence of such a chance to avoid doing the harm as a man is usually allowed。 But the fact that remote inadvertence has been suggested for an explanation illustrates what has been said about the difficulty of deciding whether a given rule is founded on special grounds； or has been worked out within the sphere of negligence； when once a special rule has been laid down。
It is further to be noticed that there is no question of the defendant's knowledge of the nature of tigers； although without that knowledge he cannot be said to have intelligently chosen to subject the community to danger。 Here again even in the domain of knowledge the law applies its principle of averages。 The fact that tigers and bears are ：：dangerous is so generally known； that a man who keeps them is presumed to know their peculiarities。 In other words； he does actually know that he has