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CRITIAS： I do not think so。
SOCRATES： Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things for
the use of the body？
CRITIAS： Certainly not。
SOCRATES： And if they appear useless to this end； ought they not always to
appear useless？ For we have already laid down the principle that things
cannot be at one time useful and at another time not； in the same process。
CRITIAS： But in that respect your argument and mine are the same。 For you
maintain if they are useful to a certain end； they can never become
useless； whereas I say that in order to accomplish some results bad things
are needed； and good for others。
SOCRATES： But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose？
CRITIAS： I should say not。
SOCRATES： And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake of
virtue？
CRITIAS： Yes。
SOCRATES： But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by
word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing？
CRITIAS： Certainly not； I think。
SOCRATES： And will not hearing be useful for virtue； if virtue is taught
by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction？
CRITIAS： Yes。
SOCRATES： And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease； that art
too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue； e。g。 when
hearing is procured by the aid of medicine。
CRITIAS： Very likely。
SOCRATES： But if； again； we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine； shall we
not regard wealth as useful for virtue？
CRITIAS： True。
SOCRATES： And also the instruments by which wealth is procured？
CRITIAS： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad and disgraceful
means； and； having obtained the aid of medicine which enables him to
acquire the power of hearing； may use that very faculty for the acquisition
of virtue？
CRITIAS： Yes； I do。
SOCRATES： But can that which is evil be useful for virtue？
CRITIAS： No。
SOCRATES： It is not therefore necessary that the means by which we obtain
what is useful for a certain object should always be useful for the same
object： for it seems that bad actions may sometimes serve good purposes？
The matter will be still plainer if we look at it in this way：If things
are useful towards the several ends for which they exist； which ends would
not come into existence without them； how would you regard them？ Can
ignorance； for instance； be useful for knowledge； or disease for health； or
vice for virtue？
CRITIAS： Never。
SOCRATES： And yet we have already agreedhave we not？that there can be
no knowledge where there has not previously been ignorance； nor health
where there has not been disease； nor virtue where there has not been vice？
CRITIAS： I think that we have。
SOCRATES： But then it would seem that the antecedents without which a
thing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it。 Otherwise ignorance
would appear useful for knowledge； disease for health； and vice for virtue。
Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument which went to
prove that all these things were useless。 I saw that it was as difficult
to persuade him as （according to the proverb） it is to boil a stone； so I
said： Let us bid 'good…bye' to the discussion； since we cannot agree
whether these things are useful and a part of wealth or not。 But what
shall we say to another question： Which is the happier and better man；he
who requires the greatest quantity of necessaries for body and diet； or he
who requires only the fewest and least？ The answer will perhaps become
more obvious if we suppose some one； comparing the man himself at different
times； to consider whether his condition is better when he is sick or when
he is well？
CRITIAS： That is not a question which needs much consideration。
SOCRATES： Probably； I said； every one can understand that health is a
better condition than disease。 But when have we the greatest and the most
various needs； when we are sick or when we are well？
CRITIAS： When we are sick。
SOCRATES： And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and most
especial need and desire of bodily pleasures？
CRITIAS： True。
SOCRATES： And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in need of
such things； does not the same reasoning apply to the case of any two
persons； of whom one has many and great wants and desires； and the other
few and moderate？ For instance； some men are gamblers； some drunkards； and
some gluttons： and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are all
desires？
CRITIAS： Certainly。
SOCRATES： But desires are only the lack of something： and those who have
the greatest desires are in a worse condition than those who have none or
very slight ones？
CRITIAS： Certainly I consider that those who have such wants are bad； and
that the greater their wants the worse they are。
SOCRATES： And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for a
purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose？
CRITIAS： No。
SOCRATES： Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the
body； we must want them for that purpose？
CRITIAS： That is my opinion。
SOCRATES： And he to whom the greatest number of things are useful for his
purpose； will also want the greatest number of means of accomplishing it；
supposing that we necessarily feel the want of all useful things？
CRITIAS： It seems so。
SOCRATES： The argument proves then that he who has great riches has
likewise need of many things for the supply of the wants of the body； for
wealth appears useful towards that end。 And the richest must be in the
worst condition； since they seem to be most in want of such things。
End