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de objectively in what way we are to conceive this possibility； whether by universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over nature； or only on supposition of such an Author。 Now here there comes in a subjective condition of reason； the only way theoretically possible for it； of conceiving the exact harmony of the kingdom of nature with the kingdom of morals； which is the condition of the possibility of the summum bonum； and at the same time the only one conducive to morality （which depends on an objective law of reason）。 Now since the promotion of this summum bonum； and therefore the supposition of its possibility； are objectively necessary （though only as a result of practical reason）； while at the same time the manner in which we would conceive it rests with our own choice； and in this choice a free interest of pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a wise Author of the world； it is clear that the principle that herein determines our judgement； though as a want it is subjective； yet at the same time being the means of promoting what is objectively （practically） necessary； is the foundation of a maxim of belief in a moral point of view； that is； a faith of pure practical reason。 This； then； is not commanded； but being a voluntary determination of our judgement； conducive to the moral （commanded） purpose； and moreover harmonizing with the theoretical requirement of reason； to assume that existence and to make it the foundation of our further employment of reason； it has itself sprung from the moral disposition of mind； it may therefore at times waver even in the well…disposed； but can never be reduced to unbelief。
IX。 Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his Practical Destination。
If human nature is destined to endeavour after the summum bonum； we must suppose also that the measure of its cognitive faculties； and particularly their relation to one another； is suitable to this end。 Now the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason proves that this is incapable of solving satisfactorily the most weighty problems that are proposed to it； although it does not ignore the natural and important hints received from the same reason； nor the great steps that it can make to approach to this great goal that is set before it； which； however； it can never reach of itself； even with the help of the greatest knowledge of nature。 Nature then seems here to have provided us only in a stepmotherly fashion with the faculty required for our end。 Suppose； now； that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish and had given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment which we would gladly possess； or which some imagine they actually possess； what would in all probability be the consequence？ Unless our whole nature were at the same time changed； our inclinations； which always have the first word； would first of all demand their own satisfaction； and； joined with rational reflection； the greatest possible and most lasting satisfaction； under the name of happiness； the moral law would afterwards speak； in order to keep them within their proper bounds； and even to subject them all to a higher end； which has no regard to inclination。 But instead of the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the inclinations； in which； though after some defeats； moral strength of mind may be gradually acquired； God and eternity with their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes （for what we can prove perfectly is to us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of our eyes）。 Transgression of the law； would； no doubt； be avoided； what is commanded would be done； but the mental disposition； from which actions ought to proceed； cannot be infused by any command； and in this case the spur of action is ever active and external； so that reason has no need to exert itself in order to gather strength to resist the inclinations by a lively representation of the dignity of the law： hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would be done from fear； a few only from hope； and none at all from duty； and the moral worth of actions； on which alone in the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world depends； would cease to exist。 As long as the nature of man remains what it is； his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism； in which； as in a puppet…show； everything would gesticulate well； but there would be no life in the figures。 Now； when it is quite otherwise with us； when with all the effort of our reason we have only a very obscure and doubtful view into the future； when the Governor of the world allows us only to conjecture his existence and his majesty； not to behold them or prove them clearly； and on the other hand； the moral law within us； without promising or threatening anything with certainty； demands of us disinterested respect； and only when this respect has become active and dominant； does it allow us by means of it a prospect into the world of the supersensible； and then only with weak glances： all this being so； there is room for true moral disposition； immediately devoted to the law； and a rational creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his actions。 Thus what the study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also； that the unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it has granted。 SECOND PART。
Methodology of Pure Practical Reason。
By the methodology of pure practical reason we are not to understand the mode of proceeding with pure practical principles （whether in study or in exposition）； with a view to a scientific knowledge of them； which alone is what is properly called method elsewhere in theoretical philosophy （for popular knowledge requires a manner； science a method； i。e。； a process according to principles of reason by which alone the manifold of any branch of knowledge can become a system）。 On the contrary； by this methodology is understood the mode in which we can give the laws of pure practical reason access to the human mind and influence on its maxims； that is； by which we can make the objectively practical reason subjectively practical also。 Now it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will which alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth； namely； the direct conception of the law and the objective necessity of obeying it as our duty； must be regarded as the proper springs of actions； since otherwise legality of actions might be produced； but not morality of character。 But it is not so clear； on the contrary； it must at first sight seem to every one very improbable that even subjectively that exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind； and supply a far stronger spring even for effecting that legality of actions； and can produce more powerful resolutions to prefer the law； from pure respect for it； to every other consideration； than all the deceptive allurements of pleasure or of all that may be reckoned as happiness