the critique of practical reason-第30章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


assured　that　there　is　no　proof　of　its　impossibility；　and　are　now；　by　the　moral　law　which　postulates　it；　compelled　and　therefore　authorized　to　assume　it。　However；　there　are　still　many　who　think　that　they　can　explain　this　freedom　on　empirical　principles；　like　any　other　physical　faculty；　and　treat　it　as　a　psychological　property；　the　explanation　of　which　only　requires　a　more　exact　study　of　the　nature　of　the　soul　and　of　the　motives　of　the　will；　and　not　as　a　transcendental　predicate　of　the　causality　of　a　being　that　belongs　to　the　world　of　sense　（which　is　really　the　point）。　They　thus　deprive　us　of　the　grand　revelation　which　we　obtain　through　practical　reason　by　means　of　the　moral　law；　the　revelation；　namely；　of　a　supersensible　world　by　the　realization　of　the　otherwise　transcendent　concept　of　freedom；　and　by　this　deprive　us　also　of　the　moral　law　itself；　which　admits　no　empirical　principle　of　determination。　Therefore　it　will　be　necessary　to　add　something　here　as　a　protection　against　this　delusion　and　to　exhibit　empiricism　in　its　naked　superficiality。　　　The　notion　of　causality　as　physical　necessity；　in　opposition　to　the　same　notion　as　freedom；　concerns　only　the　existence　of　things　so　far　as　it　is　determinable　in　time；　and；　consequently；　as　phenomena；　in　opposition　to　their　causality　as　things　in　themselves。　Now　if　we　take　the　attributes　of　existence　of　things　in　time　for　attributes　of　things　in　themselves　（which　is　the　common　view）；　then　it　is　impossible　to　reconcile　the　necessity　of　the　causal　relation　with　freedom；　they　are　contradictory。　For　from　the　former　it　follows　that　every　event；　and　consequently　every　action　that　takes　place　at　a　certain　point　of　time；　is　a　necessary　result　of　what　existed　in　time　preceding。　Now　as　time　past　is　no　longer　in　my　power；　hence　every　action　that　I　perform　must　be　the　necessary　result　of　certain　determining　grounds　which　are　not　in　my　power；　that　is；　at　the　moment　in　which　I　am　acting　I　am　never　free。　Nay；　even　if　I　assume　that　my　whole　existence　is　independent　on　any　foreign　cause　（for　instance；　God）；　so　that　the　determining　principles　of　my　causality；　and　even　of　my　whole　existence；　were　not　outside　myself；　yet　this　would　not　in　the　least　transform　that　physical　necessity　into　freedom。　For　at　every　moment　of　time　I　am　still　under　the　necessity　of　being　determined　to　action　by　that　which　is　not　in　my　power；　and　the　series　of　events　infinite　a　parte　priori；　which　I　only　continue　according　to　a　pre…determined　order　and　could　never　begin　of　myself；　would　be　a　continuous　physical　chain；　and　therefore　my　causality　would　never　be　freedom。　　　If；　then；　we　would　attribute　freedom　to　a　being　whose　existence　is　determined　in　time；　we　cannot　except　him　from　the　law　of　necessity　as　to　all　events　in　his　existence　and；　consequently；　as　to　his　actions　also；　for　that　would　be　to　hand　him　over　to　blind　chance。　Now　as　this　law　inevitably　applies　to　all　the　causality　of　things；　so　far　as　their　existence　is　determinable　in　time；　it　follows　that　if　this　were　the　mode　in　which　we　had　also　to　conceive　the　existence　of　these　things　in　themselves；　freedom　must　be　rejected　as　a　vain　and　impossible　conception。　Consequently；　if　we　would　still　save　it；　no　other　way　remains　but　to　consider　that　the　existence　of　a　thing；　so　far　as　it　is　determinable　in　time；　and　therefore　its　causality；　according　to　the　law　of　physical　necessity；　belong　to　appearance；　and　to　attribute　freedom　to　the　same　being　as　a　thing　in　itself。　This　is　certainly　inevitable；　if　we　would　retain　both　these　contradictory　concepts　together；　but　in　application；　when　we　try　to　explain　their　combination　in　one　and　the　same　action；　great　difficulties　present　themselves　which　seem　to　render　such　a　combination　impracticable。　　　When　I　say　of　a　man　who　commits　a　theft　that；　by　the　law　of　causality；　this　deed　is　a　necessary　result　of　the　determining　causes　in　preceding　time；　then　it　was　impossible　that　it　could　not　have　happened；　how　then　can　the　judgement；　according　to　the　moral　law；　make　any　change；　and　suppose　that　it　could　have　been　omitted；　because　the　law　says　that　it　ought　to　have　been　omitted；　that　is；　how　can　a　man　be　called　quite　free　at　the　same　moment；　and　with　respect　to　the　same　action　in　which　he　is　subject　to　an　inevitable　physical　necessity？　Some　try　to　evade　this　by　saying　that　the　causes　that　determine　his　causality　are　of　such　a　kind　as　to　agree　with　a　comparative　notion　of　freedom。　According　to　this；　that　is　sometimes　called　a　free　effect；　the　determining　physical　cause　of　which　lies　within　the　acting　thing　itself；　e。g。；　that　which　a　projectile　performs　when　it　is　in　free　motion；　in　which　case　we　use　the　word　freedom；　because　while　it　is　in　flight　it　is　not　urged　by　anything　external；　or　as　we　call　the　motion　of　a　clock　a　free　motion；　because　it　moves　its　hands　itself；　which　therefore　do　not　require　to　be　pushed　by　external　force；　so　although　the　actions　of　man　are　necessarily　determined　by　causes　which　precede　in　time；　we　yet　call　them　free；　because　these　causes　are　ideas　produced　by　our　own　faculties；　whereby　desires　are　evoked　on　occasion　of　circumstances；　and　hence　actions　are　wrought　according　to　our　own　pleasure。　This　is　a　wretched　subterfuge　with　which　some　persons　still　let　themselves　be　put　off；　and　so　think　they　have　solved；　with　a　petty　word…　jugglery；　that　difficult　problem；　at　the　solution　of　which　centuries　have　laboured　in　vain；　and　which　can　therefore　scarcely　be　found　so　completely　on　the　surface。　In　fact；　in　the　question　about　the　freedom　which　must　be　the　foundation　of　all　moral　laws　and　the　consequent　responsibility；　it　does　not　matter　whether　the　principles　which　necessarily　determine　causality　by　a　physical　law　reside　within　the　subject　or　without　him；　or　in　the　former　case　whether　these　principles　are　instinctive　or　are　conceived　by　reason；　if；　as　is　admitted　by　these　men　themselves；　these　determining　ideas　have　the　ground　of　their　existence　in　time　and　in　the　antecedent　state；　and　this　again　in　an　antecedent；　etc。　Then　it　matters　not　that　these　are　internal；　it　matters　not　that　they　have　a　psychological　and　not　a　mechanical　causality；　that　is；　produce　actions　by　means　of　ideas　and　not　by　bodily　movements；　they　are　still　determining　principles　of　the　causality　of　a　being　whose　existence　is　determinable　in　time；　and　therefore　under　the　necessitation　of　conditions　of　past　time；　which　therefore；　when　the　subject　has　to　act；　are　no　longer　in　his　power。　This　may　imply　psychological　freedom　（if　we　choose　to　apply　this　term　to　a　merely　internal　chain　of　ideas　in　the　mind）；　but　it　involves　physical　necessity　and；　therefore；　leaves　no　room　for　transcendental　freedom；　which　must　be　conceived　as　independence　on　everything　empirical；　and；　consequently；　on　nature　generally；　whether　it　is　an　object　of　the　internal　sense　considered　in　time　only；　or　of　the　external　in　time　and　space。　Without　this　freedom　（in　the　latter　and　true　sense）；　which　alone　is　practical　a　priori；　no　moral　law　and　no　moral　imputation　are　possible。　just　for　this　reason　the　necessity　of　events　in　time；　according　to　the　physical　law　of　causality；　may　be　called　the　mechanism　of　nature；　although　we　do　not　mean　by　this　that　things　which　are　subject　to　it　must　be　really　material　mach