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ence may； indeed； be united with it； but the man who has deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this。 Punishment； then； is a physical evil； which； though it be not connected with moral evil as a natural consequence； ought to be connected with it as a consequence by the principles of a moral legislation。 Now； if every crime； even without regarding the physical consequence with respect to the actor； is in itself punishable； that is； forfeits happiness （at least partially）； it is obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in this； that be has drawn punishment on himself； thereby injuring his private happiness （which； on the principle of self…love； must be the proper notion of all crime）。 According to this view； the punishment would be the reason for calling anything a crime； and justice would； on the contrary； consist in omitting all punishment； and even preventing that which naturally follows； for； if this were done； there would no longer be any evil in the action； since the harm which otherwise followed it； and on account of which alone the action was called evil； would now be prevented。 To look； however； on all rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a higher power； which is to serve only to set rational creatures striving after their final end （happiness）； this is to reduce the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom； this is so evident that it need not detain us。 More refined； though equally false； is the theory of those who suppose a certain special moral sense； which sense and not reason determines the moral law； and in consequence of which the consciousness of virtue is supposed to be directly connected with contentment and pleasure； that of vice； with mental dissatisfaction and pain； thus reducing the whole to the desire of private happiness。 Without repeating what has been said above； I will here only remark the fallacy they fall into。 In order to imagine the vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the consciousness of his transgressions； they must first represent him as in the main basis of his character； at least in some degree； morally good； just as he who is pleased with the consciousness of right conduct must be conceived as already virtuous。 The notion of morality and duty must； therefore； have preceded any regard to this satisfaction； and cannot be derived from it。 A man must first appreciate the importance of what we call duty； the authority of the moral law； and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives to the person in his own eyes； in order to feel that satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter remorse that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression。 It is； therefore； impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction prior to the knowledge of obligation； or to make it the basis of the latter。 A man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to form a conception of these feelings。 I do not deny that as the human will is； by virtue of liberty； capable of being immediately determined by the moral law； so frequent practice in accordance with this principle of determination can； at least； produce subjectively a feeling of satisfaction； on the contrary； it is a duty to establish and to cultivate this； which alone deserves to be called properly the moral feeling； but the notion of duty cannot be derived from it； else we should have to suppose a feeling for the law as such； and thus make that an object of sensation which can only be thought by the reason； and this； if it is not to be a flat contradiction； would destroy all notion of duty and put in its place a mere mechanical play of refined inclinations sometimes contending with the coarser。 If now we compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical reason （that of autonomy of the will） with all previous material principles of morality； we can exhibit them all in a table in which all possible cases are exhausted； except the one formal principle； and thus we can show visibly that it is vain to look for any other principle than that now proposed。 In fact all possible principles of determination of the will are either merely subjective； and therefore empirical； or are also objective and rational； and both are either external or internal。
Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the Foundation of Morality； are：
SUBJECTIVE。
EXTERNAL INTERNAL Education Physical feeling （Montaigne） （Epicurus） The civil Moral feeling Constitution （Hutcheson） （Mandeville）
OBJECTIVE。
INTERNAL EXTERNAL Perfection Will of God （Wolf and the （Crusius and other Stoics） theological Moralists）
Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable of furnishing the universal principle of morality； but those in the lower table are based on reason （for perfection as a quality of things； and the highest perfection conceived as substance； that is； God； can only be thought by means of rational concepts）。 But the former notion； namely； that of perfection； may either be taken in a theoretic signification； and then it means nothing but the completeness of each thing in its own kind （transcendental）； or that of a thing merely as a thing （metaphysical）； and with that we are not concerned here。 But the notion of perfection in a practical sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of purposes。 This perfection； as a quality of man and consequently internal； is nothing but talent and； what strengthens or completes this； skill。 Supreme perfection conceived as substance； that is God； and consequently external （considered practically）； is the sufficiency of this being for all ends。 Ends then must first be given； relatively to which only can the notion of perfection （whether internal in ourselves or external in God） be the determining principle of the will。 But an end… being an object which must precede the determination of the will by a practical rule and contain the ground of the possibility of this determination； and therefore contain also the matter of the will； taken as its determining principle… such an end is always empirical and； therefore； may serve for the Epicurean principle of the happiness theory； but not for the pure rational principle of morality and duty。 Thus； talents and the improvement of them； because they contribute to the advantages of life； or the will of God； if agreement with it be taken as the object of the will； without any antecedent independent practical principle； can be motives only by reason of the happiness expected therefrom。 Hence it follows； first； that all the principles here stated are material； secondly； that they include all possible material principles； and； finally； the conclusion； that since material principles are quite incapable of furnishing the supreme moral law （as has been shown）； the formal practical principle the pure reason （according to which the mere form of a universal l