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it has no soul which contains them？
Theaet。 And in what other way can it contain them？
Str。 Or that being has mind and life and soul； but although
endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved？
Theaet。 All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational。
Str。 Under being； then； we must include motion； and that which is
moved。
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 Then； Theaetetus； our inference is； that if there is
no motion；
neither is there any mind anywhere； or about anything or belonging
to any one。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 And yet this equally follows； if we grant that all things are
in motion…upon this view too mind has no existence。
Theaet。 How so？
Str。 Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject
could ever exist without a principle of rest？
Theaet。 Certainly not。
Str。 Can you see how without them mind could exist； or come into
existence anywhere？
Theaet。 No。
Str。 And surely contend we must in every possible way against him
who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind； and yet ventures
to speak confidently about anything。
Theaet。 Yes； with all our might。
Str。 Then the philosopher； who has the truest reverence for these
qualities； cannot possibly accept the notion of those who
say that the
whole is at rest； either as unity or in many forms： and he will be
utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion。 As children say
entreatingly 〃Give us both。〃 so he will include both the moveable
and immoveable in his definition of being and all。
Theaet。 Most true。
Str。 And now； do we seem to have gained a fair notion of being？
Theaet。 Yes truly。
Str。 Alas； Theaetetus； methinks that we are now only beginning to
see the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it。
Theaet。 What do you mean？
Str。 O my friend； do you not see that nothing can exceed out
ignorance； and yet we fancy that we are saying something good？
Theaet。 I certainly thought that we were； and I do not at all
understand how we never found out our desperate case。
Str。 Reflect： after having made； these admissions； may we not be
justly asked； the same questions which we ourselves were asking of
those who said that all was hot and cold？
Theaet。 What were they？ Will you recall them to my mind？
Str。 To be sure； I will remind you of them； by putting the same
questions； to you which I did to them； and then we shall get on。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire
opposition to one another？
Theaet。 Of course。
Str。 And yet you would say that both and either of them
equally are？
Theaet。 I should。
Str。 And when you admit that both or either of them are；
do you mean
to say that both or either； of them are in motion？
Theaet。 Certainly not。
Str。 Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest； when you
say that they are？
Theaet。 Of course not。
Str。 Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature；
under which rest and motion are alike included； and； observing that
they both participate in being； you declare that they are。
Theaet。 Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is
some third
thing； when we say that rest and motion are。
Str。 Then being is not the combination of rest and motion； but
something different from them。
Theaet。 So it would appear。
Str。 Being； then； according to its own nature； is neither in
motion nor at rest。
Theaet。 That is very much the truth。
Str。 Where； then； is a man to look for help who would have
any clear
or fixed notion of being in his mind？
Theaet。 Where； indeed？
Str。 I scarcely think that he can look anywhere； for that which is
not in motion must be at rest； and again； that which is not at rest
must be in motion； but being is placed outside of both these
classes。 Is this possible？
Theaet。 Utterly impossible。
Str。 Here； then； is another thing which we ought to bear in mind。
Theaet。 What？
Str。 When we were asked to what we were to assign the
appellation of
not…being； we were in the greatest difficulty：…do you remember？
Theaet。 To be sure。
Str。 And are we not now in as a difficulty about being？
Theaes。 I should say； Stranger； that we are in one which is； if
possible； even greater。
Str。 Then let us acknowledge the difficulty； and as being and
not…being are involved in the same perplexity； there is hope
that when
the one appears more or less distinctly； the other will equally
appear； and if we are able to see neither there may still be a
chance of steering our way in between them； without any great
discredit。
Theaet。 Very good。
Str。 Let us enquire； then； how we come to predicate many names of
the same thing。
Theaet。 Give an example。
Str。 I mean that we speak of man； for example； under many
names…that
we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and virtues and
vices； in all of which instances and in ten thousand others we not
only speak of him as a man； but also as good； and having number…less
other attributes； and in the same way anything else which we
originally supposed to be one is described by us as many； and under
many names。
Theaet。 That is true。
Str。 And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros； whether young or
old； for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot
be many； or the many one； and great is their delight in
denying that a
man is good； for man； they insist； is man and good is good。
I dare say
that you have met with persons who take…an interest in such
matters…they are often elderly men； whose meagre sense is thrown
into amazement by these discoveries of theirs； which they believe to
be the height of wisdom。
Theaet。 Certainly； I have。
Str。 Then； not to exclude any one who has ever speculated at all
upon the nature of being； let us put our questions to them as well
as to our former friends。
Theaet。 What questions？
Str。 Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest； or
anything to anything； and assume that they do not mingle； and are
incapable of participating in one another？ Or shall we
gather all into
one class of things communicable with one another？ Or are some
things communicable and others not？…Which of these alternatives；
Theaetetus； will they prefer？
Theaet。 I have nothing to answer on their behalf。 Suppose that you
take all these hypotheses in turn； and see what are the consequences
which follow from each of them。
Str。 Very good； and first let us assume them to say that nothing
is capable of participating in anything else in any respect； in that
case rest and motion cannot participate in being at all。
Theaet。 They cannot。
Str。 But would either of them be if not participating in being？
Theaet。 No。
Str。 Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned； as
well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest； and also
the doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and
everlasting kinds； for all these add on a notion of being； some
affirming that things 〃are〃 truly in motion； a