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ideas； the bodies of the materialists； which by them are
maintained to
be the very truth； they break up into little bits by their
arguments； and affirm them to be； not essence； but generation and
motion。 Between the two armies； Theaetetus； there is always
an endless
conflict raging concerning these matters。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 Let us ask each party in turn； to give an account of
that which
they call essence。
Theaet。 How shall we get it out of them？
Str。 With those who make being to consist in ideas； there will be
less difficulty； for they are civil people enough； but there will be
very great difficulty； or rather an absolute impossibility；
in getting
an opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter。 Shall I
tell you what we must do？
Theaet。 What？
Str。 Let us； if we can； really improve them； but if this is not
possible； let us imagine them to be better than they are； and more
willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument； and then
their opinion will be more worth having； for that which better men
acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by
inferior men。 Moreover we are no respecters of persons； but seekers
after time。
Theaet。 Very good。
Str。 Then now； on the supposition that they are improved；
let us ask
them to state their views； and do you interpret them。
Theaet。 Agreed。
Str。 Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a
thing as a mortal animal。
Theaet。 Of course they would。
Str。 And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul？
Theaet。 Certainly they do。
Str。 Meaning to say the soul is something which exists？
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And do they not say that one soul is just； and another
unjust； and that one soul is wise； and another foolish？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by the
possession of justice and wisdom； and the opposite under opposite
circumstances？
Theaet。 Yes； they do。
Str。 But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be
admitted by them to exist？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 And； allowing that justice； wisdom； the other virtues； and
their opposites exist； as well as a soul in which they
inhere； do they
affirm any of them to be visible and tangible； or are they all
invisible？
Theaet。 They would say that hardly any of them are visible。
Str。 And would they say that they are corporeal？
Theaet。 They would distinguish： the soul would be said by them to
have a body； but as to the other qualities of justice；
wisdom； and the
like； about which you asked； they would not venture either to deny
their existence； or to maintain that they were all corporeal。
Str。 Verily； Theaetetus； I perceive a great improvement in
them； the
real aborigines； children of the dragon's teeth； would have been
deterred by no shame at all； but would have obstinately asserted
that nothing is which they are not able to squeeze in their hands。
Theaet。 That is pretty much their notion。
Str。 Let us push the question； for if they will admit that
any； even
the smallest particle of being； is incorporeal； it is enough； they
must then say what that nature is which is common to both the
corporeal and incorporeal； and which they have in their mind's eye
when they say of both of them that they 〃are。〃 Perhaps they may be
in a difficulty； and if this is the case； there is a possibility
that they may accept a notion of ours respecting the nature of
being； having nothing of their own to offer。
Theaet。 What is the notion？ Tell me； and we shall soon see。
Str。 My notion would be； that anything which possesses any sort of
power to affect another； or to be affected by another； if only for a
single moment； however trifling the cause and however slight the
effect； has real existence； and I hold that the definition
of being is
simply power of
Theaet。 They accept your suggestion； having nothing better of
their own to offer。
Str。 Very good； perhaps we； as well as they； may one day change
our minds； but； for the present； this may be regarded as the
understanding which is established with them。
Theaet。 Agreed。
Str。 Let us now go to the friends of ideas； of their opinions；
too； you shall be the interpreter。
Theaet。 I will。
Str。 To them we say…You would distinguish essence from generation？
Theaet。 〃Yes；〃 they reply。
Str。 And you would allow that we participate in
generation； with the
body； and through perception； but we participate with the
soul through
in true essence； and essence you would affirm to be always the same
and immutable； whereas generation or becoming varies？
Theaet。 Yes； that is what we should affirm。
Str。 Well； fair sirs； we say to them； what is this participation；
which you assert of both？ Do you agree with our recent definition？
Theaet。 What definition？
Str。 We said that being was an active or passive energy；
arising out
of a certain power which proceeds from elements meeting with one
another。 Perhaps your cars； Theaetetus； may fail to catch their
answer； which I recognize because I have been accustomed to hear it。
Theaet。 And what is their answer？
Str。 They deny the truth of what we were just now； saying to the
aborigines about existence。
Theaet。 What was that？
Str。 Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight
was held by us to be a sufficient definition of being？
Theaet。 True。
Str。 They deny this； and say that the power of doing or
suffering is
confined to becoming； and that neither power is applicable to being。
Theaet。 And is there not some truth in what they say？
Str。 Yes； but our reply will be that we want to ascertain from
them more distinctly； whether they further admit that the soul
knows； and that being or essence is known。
Theaet。 There can be no doubt that they say so。
Str。 And is knowing and being known； doing or suffering；
or both； or
is the one doing and the other suffering； or has neither any share
in either？
Theaet。 Clearly； neither has any share in either； for if they say
anything else； they will contradict themselves。
Str。 I understand； but they will allow that if to know is active；
then； of course； to be known is passive。 And on this view
being； in so
far as it is known； is acted upon by knowledge； and is therefore in
motion； for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon；
as we affirm。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And； O heavens； can we ever be made to believe that motion
and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being？ Can
we imagine that； being is devoid of life and mind； and
exists in awful
unmeaningness an everlasting fixture？
Theaet。 That would be a dreadful thing to admit； Stranger。
Str。 But shall we say that has mind and not life？
Theaet。 How is that possible？
Str。 Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being； but that
it has no soul which contains them？
Theaet。 And in what other way can it contain them？
Str。 Or that being has mind and life and soul； but although