on the soul-第7章

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element　will　indeed　know　its　fellow　outside；　but　there　will　be　no　knowledge　of　bone　or　man；　unless　they　too　are　present　in　the　constitution　of　the　soul。　The　impossibility　of　this　needs　no　pointing　out；　for　who　would　suggest　that　stone　or　man　could　enter　into　the　constitution　of　the　soul？　The　same　applies　to　'the　good'　and　'the　not…good'；　and　so　on。　　　Further；　the　word　'is'　has　many　meanings：　it　may　be　used　of　a　'this'　or　substance；　or　of　a　quantum；　or　of　a　quale；　or　of　any　other　of　the　kinds　of　predicates　we　have　distinguished。　Does　the　soul　consist　of　all　of　these　or　not？　It　does　not　appear　that　all　have　common　elements。　Is　the　soul　formed　out　of　those　elements　alone　which　enter　into　substances？　so　how　will　it　be　able　to　know　each　of　the　other　kinds　of　thing？　Will　it　be　said　that　each　kind　of　thing　has　elements　or　principles　of　its　own；　and　that　the　soul　is　formed　out　of　the　whole　of　these？　In　that　case；　the　soul　must　be　a　quantum　and　a　quale　and　a　substance。　But　all　that　can　be　made　out　of　the　elements　of　a　quantum　is　a　quantum；　not　a　substance。　These　（and　others　like　them）　are　the　consequences　of　the　view　that　the　soul　is　composed　of　all　the　elements。　　　It　is　absurd；　also；　to　say　both　（a）　that　like　is　not　capable　of　being　affected　by　like；　and　（b）　that　like　is　perceived　or　known　by　like；　for　perceiving；　and　also　both　thinking　and　knowing；　are；　on　their　own　assumption；　ways　of　being　affected　or　moved。　　　There　are　many　puzzles　and　difficulties　raised　by　saying；　as　Empedocles　does；　that　each　set　of　things　is　known　by　means　of　its　corporeal　elements　and　by　reference　to　something　in　soul　which　is　like　them；　and　additional　testimony　is　furnished　by　this　new　consideration；　for　all　the　parts　of　the　animal　body　which　consist　wholly　of　earth　such　as　bones；　sinews；　and　hair　seem　to　be　wholly　insensitive　and　consequently　not　perceptive　even　of　objects　earthy　like　themselves；　as　they　ought　to　have　been。　　　Further；　each　of　the　principles　will　have　far　more　ignorance　than　knowledge；　for　though　each　of　them　will　know　one　thing；　there　will　be　many　of　which　it　will　be　ignorant。　Empedocles　at　any　rate　must　conclude　that　his　God　is　the　least　intelligent　of　all　beings；　for　of　him　alone　is　it　true　that　there　is　one　thing；　Strife；　which　he　does　not　know；　while　there　is　nothing　which　mortal　beings　do　not　know；　for　ere　is　nothing　which　does　not　enter　into　their　composition。　　　In　general；　we　may　ask；　Why　has　not　everything　a　soul；　since　everything　either　is　an　element；　or　is　formed　out　of　one　or　several　or　all　of　the　elements？　Each　must　certainly　know　one　or　several　or　all。　　　The　problem　might　also　be　raised；　What　is　that　which　unifies　the　elements　into　a　soul？　The　elements　correspond；　it　would　appear；　to　the　matter；　what　unites　them；　whatever　it　is；　is　the　supremely　important　factor。　But　it　is　impossible　that　there　should　be　something　superior　to；　and　dominant　over；　the　soul　（and　a　fortiori　over　the　mind）；　it　is　reasonable　to　hold　that　mind　is　by　nature　most　primordial　and　dominant；　while　their　statement　that　it　is　the　elements　which　are　first　of　all　that　is。　　　All；　both　those　who　assert　that　the　soul；　because　of　its　knowledge　or　perception　of　what　is　compounded　out　of　the　elements；　and　is　those　who　assert　that　it　is　of　all　things　the　most　originative　of　movement；　fail　to　take　into　consideration　all　kinds　of　soul。　In　fact　（1）　not　all　beings　that　perceive　can　originate　movement；　there　appear　to　be　certain　animals　which　stationary；　and　yet　local　movement　is　the　only　one；　so　it　seems；　which　the　soul　originates　in　animals。　And　（2）　the　same　object…on　holds　against　all　those　who　construct　mind　and　the　perceptive　faculty　out　of　the　elements；　for　it　appears　that　plants　live；　and　yet　are　not　endowed　with　locomotion　or　perception；　while　a　large　number　of　animals　are　without　discourse　of　reason。　Even　if　these　points　were　waived　and　mind　admitted　to　be　a　part　of　the　soul　（and　so　too　the　perceptive　faculty）；　still；　even　so；　there　would　be　kinds　and　parts　of　soul　of　which　they　had　failed　to　give　any　account。　　　The　same　objection　lies　against　the　view　expressed　in　the　'Orphic'　poems：　there　it　is　said　that　the　soul　comes　in　from　the　whole　when　breathing　takes　place；　being　borne　in　upon　the　winds。　Now　this　cannot　take　place　in　the　case　of　plants；　nor　indeed　in　the　case　of　certain　classes　of　animal；　for　not　all　classes　of　animal　breathe。　This　fact　has　escaped　the　notice　of　the　holders　of　this　view。　　　If　we　must　construct　the　soul　out　of　the　elements；　there　is　no　necessity　to　suppose　that　all　the　elements　enter　into　its　construction；　one　element　in　each　pair　of　contraries　will　suffice　to　enable　it　to　know　both　that　element　itself　and　its　contrary。　By　means　of　the　straight　line　we　know　both　itself　and　the　curved…the　carpenter's　rule　enables　us　to　test　both…but　what　is　curved　does　not　enable　us　to　distinguish　either　itself　or　the　straight。　Certain　thinkers　say　that　soul　is　intermingled　in　the　whole　universe；　and　it　is　perhaps　for　that　reason　that　Thales　came　to　the　opinion　that　all　things　are　full　of　gods。　This　presents　some　difficulties：　Why　does　the　soul　when　it　resides　in　air　or　fire　not　form　an　animal；　while　it　does　so　when　it　resides　in　mixtures　of　the　elements；　and　that　although　it　is　held　to　be　of　higher　quality　when　contained　in　the　former？　（One　might　add　the　question；　why　the　soul　in　air　is　maintained　to　be　higher　and　more　immortal　than　that　in　animals。）　Both　possible　ways　of　replying　to　the　former　question　lead　to　absurdity　or　paradox；　for　it　is　beyond　paradox　to　say　that　fire　or　air　is　an　animal；　and　it　is　absurd　to　refuse　the　name　of　animal　to　what　has　soul　in　it。　The　opinion　that　the　elements　have　soul　in　them　seems　to　have　arisen　from　the　doctrine　that　a　whole　must　be　homogeneous　with　its　parts。　If　it　is　true　that　animals　become　animate　by　drawing　into　themselves　a　portion　of　what　surrounds　them；　the　partisans　of　this　view　are　bound　to　say　that　the　soul　of　the　Whole　too　is　homogeneous　with　all　its　parts。　If　the　air　sucked　in　is　homogeneous；　but　soul　heterogeneous；　clearly　while　some　part　of　soul　will　exist　in　the　inbreathed　air；　some　other　part　will　not。　The　soul　must　either　be　homogeneous；　or　such　that　there　are　some　parts　of　the　Whole　in　which　it　is　not　to　be　found。　　　From　what　has　been　said　it　is　now　clear　that　knowing　as　an　attribute　of　soul　cannot　be　explained　by　soul's　being　composed　of　the　elements；　and　that　it　is　neither　sound　nor　true　to　speak　of　soul　as　moved。　But　since　（a）　knowing；　perceiving；　opining；　and　further　（b）　desiring；　wishing；　and　generally　all　other　modes　of　appetition；　belong　to　soul；　and　（c）　the　local　movements　of　animals；　and　（d）　growth；　maturity；　and　decay　are　produced　by　the　soul；　we　must　ask　whether　each　of　these　is　an　attribute　of　the　soul　as　a　whole；　i。e。　whether　it　is　with　the　whole　soul　we　think；　perceive；　move　ourselves；　act　or　are　acted　upon；　or　whether　each　of　them　requires　a　different　part　of　the　soul？　So　too　with　regard　to　life。　Does　it　depend　on　one　of　the　parts　of　soul？　Or　is　it　dependent　on　more　than　one？　Or　on　all？　Or　has　it　some　quite　other　cause？　　　Some　hold　that　the　soul　is　divisible；　and　that　one　part　thinks；　another　desires。　If；　then；　its　nature　admits　of　its　being　divided；　what　can　it　be　that　holds　the　parts　toge