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the Padus； and resolved on marching to Cremona。 As he was going；
Turullius Cerialis with a great number of the levies from the fleet；
and Julius Briganticus with a few troopers； gave themselves up to him。
Julius commanded a squadron of horse； he was a Batavian。 Turullius was
a centurion of the first rank； not unfriendly to Caecina； as he had
commanded a company in Germany。
Spurinna； on discovering the enemy's route； informed Annius Gallus
by letter of the successful defence of Placentia； of what had
happened； and of what Caecina intended to do。 Gallus was then bringing
up the first legion to the relief of Placentia； he hardly dared
trust so few cohorts； fearing that they could not sustain a
prolonged siege or the formidable attack of the German army。 On
hearing that Caecina had been repulsed； and was making his way to
Cremona； though the legion could hardly be restrained； and in its
eagerness for action； even went to the length of open mutiny； he
halted at Bedriacum。 This is a village situated between Verona and
Cremona； and has now acquired an ill…omened celebrity by two great
days of disaster to Rome。 About the same time Martius Macer fought a
successful battle not far from Cremona。 Martius； who was a man of
energy； conveyed his gladiators in boats across the Padus； and
suddenly threw them upon the opposite bank。 The Vitellianist
auxiliaries on the spot were routed； those who made a stand were cut
to pieces； the rest directing their flight to Cremona。 But the
impetuosity of the victors was checked； for it was feared that the
enemy might be strengthened by reinforcements； and change the
fortune of the day。 This policy excited the suspicions of the
Othonianists； who put a sinister construction on all the acts of their
generals。 Vying with each other in an insolence of language
proportioned to their cowardice of heart； they assailed with various
accusations Annius Gallus； Suetonius Paullinus； and Marius Celsus。 The
murderers of Galba were the most ardent promoters of mutiny and
discord。 Frenzied with fear and guilt； they sought to plunge
everything into confusion； resorting； now to openly seditious
language； now to secret letters to Otho； and he； ever ready to believe
the meanest of men and suspicious of the good； irresolute in
prosperity； but rising higher under reverses； was in perpetual
alarm。 The end of it was that he sent for his brother Titianus； and
intrusted him with the direction of the campaign。
Meanwhile； brilliant successes were gained under the command of
Celsus and Paullinus。 Caecina was greatly annoyed by the fruitlessness
of all his undertakings； and by the waning reputation of his army。
He had been repulsed from Placentia； his auxiliaries had been recently
cut up； and even when the skirmishers had met in a series of
actions； frequent indeed； but not worth relating； he had been worsted；
and now that Valens was coming up； fearful that all the distinctions
of the campaign would centre in that general； he made a hasty
attempt to retrieve his credit； but with more impetuosity than
prudence。 Twelve miles from Cremona （at a place called the Castors） he
posted some of the bravest of his auxiliaries； concealed in the
woods that there overhang the road。 The cavalry were ordered to move
forward； and； after provoking a battle； voluntarily to retreat； and
draw on the enemy in hasty pursuit； till the ambuscade could make a
simultaneous attack。 The scheme was betrayed to the Othonianist
generals； and Paullinus assumed the command of the infantry； Celsus of
the cavalry。 The veterans of the 13th legion； four cohorts of
auxiliaries； and 500 cavalry； were drawn up on the left side of the
road； the raised causeway was occupied by three Praetorian cohorts；
ranged in deep columns； on the right front stood the first legion with
two cohorts of auxiliaries and 500 cavalry。 Besides these； a
thousand cavalry； belonging to the Praetorian guard and to the
auxiliaries； were brought up to complete a victory or to retrieve a
repulse。
Before the hostile lines engaged； the Vitellianists began to
retreat； but Celsus； aware of the stratagem； kept his men back。 The
Vitellianists rashly left their position； and seeing Celsus
gradually give way； followed too far in pursuit； and themselves fell
into an ambuscade。 The auxiliaries assailed them on either flank；
the legions were opposed to them in front； and the cavalry； by a
sudden movement； had surrounded their rear。 Suetonius Paullinus did
not at once give the infantry the signal to engage。 He was a man
naturally tardy in action； and one who preferred a cautious and
scientific plan of operations to any success which was the result of
accident。 He ordered the trenches to be filled up； the plain to be
cleared； and the line to be extended； holding that it would be time
enough to begin his victory when he had provided against being
vanquished。 This delay gave the Vitellianists time to retreat into
some vineyards； which were obstructed by the interlacing layers of the
vines； and close to which was a small wood。 From this place they again
ventured to emerge； slaughtering the foremost of the Praetorian
cavalry。 King Epiphanes was wounded； while he was zealously cheering
on the troops for Otho。
Then the Othonianist infantry charged。 The enemy's line was
completely crushed； and the reinforcements who were coming up to their
aid were also put to flight。 Caecina indeed had not brought up his
cohorts in a body； but one by one； as this was done during the battle；
it increased the general confusion； because the troops who were thus
divided； not being strong at any one point； were borne away by the
panic of the fugitives。 Besides this； a mutiny broke out in the camp
because the whole army was not led into action。 Julius Gratus； prefect
of the camp； was put in irons； on a suspicion of a treacherous
understanding with his brother who was serving with Otho's army； at
the very time that the Othonianists had done the same thing and on the
same grounds to that brother Julius Fronto； a tribune。 In fact such
was the panic everywhere； among the fugitives and among the troops
coming up； in the lines and in front of the entrenchments； that it was
very commonly said on both sides； that Caecina and his whole army
might have been destroyed； had not Suetonius Paullinus given the
signal of recall。 Paullinus alleged that he feared the effects of so
much additional toil and so long a march； apprehending that the
Vitellianists might issue fresh from their camp； and attack his
wearied troops； who； once thrown into confusion； would have no
reserves to fall back upon。 A few approved the general's policy； but
it was unfavourably canvassed by the army at large。
The effect of this disaster on the Vitellianists was not so much