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which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place； A； just as
well as if the two things were in every respect different from each
other。 Difference of place without any other conditions； makes the
plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena； not only possible
in itself； but even necessary。 Consequently； the above so…called law
is not a law of nature。 It is merely an analytical rule for the
comparison of things by means of mere conceptions。
2nd。 The principle： 〃Realities （as simple affirmations） never
logically contradict each other；〃 is a proposition perfectly true
respecting the relation of conceptions； but； whether as regards
nature； or things in themselves （of which we have not the slightest
conception）； is without any the least meaning。 For real opposition； in
which A … B is = 0； exists everywhere； an opposition； that is； in
which one reality united with another in the same subject
annihilates the effects of the other… a fact which is constantly
brought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and
operations in nature； which； nevertheless； as depending on real
forces； must be called realitates phaenomena。 General mechanics can
even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in
an a priori rule； as it directs its attention to the opposition in the
direction of forces… a condition of which the transcendental
conception of reality can tell us nothing。 Although M。 Leibnitz did
not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new
principle； he yet employed it for the establishment of new
propositions； and his followers introduced it into their
Leibnitzio…Wolfian system of philosophy。 According to this
principle； for example； all evils are but consequences of the
limited nature of created beings； that is； negations； because these
are the only opposite of reality。 （In the mere conception of a thing
in general this is really the case； but not in things as phenomena。）
In like manner； the upholders of this system deem it not only
possible； but natural also； to connect and unite all reality in one
being； because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than
that of contradiction （by which the conception itself of a thing is
annihilated）； and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition
of reciprocal destruction； so to speak； in which one real cause
destroys the effect of another； and the conditions of whose
representation we meet with only in sensibility。
3rd。 The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than
on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of
the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding。
Substances； in general； must have something inward； which is therefore
free from external relations； consequently from that of composition
also。 The simple… that which can be represented by a unit… is
therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in
themselves。 The internal state of substances cannot therefore
consist in place； shape； contact； or motion； determinations which
are all external relations； and we can ascribe to them no other than
that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself； that
is to say； the state of representation。 Thus； then； were constructed
the monads； which were to form the elements of the universe； the
active force of which consists in representation； the effects of
this force being thus entirely confined to themselves。
For the same reason； his view of the possible community of
substances could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony；
and by no means as a physical influence。 For inasmuch as everything is
occupied only internally； that is； with its own representations； the
state of the representations of one substance could not stand in
active and living connection with that of another； but some third
cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the
different states correspond with one another。 And this did not
happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case （systema
assistentiae）； but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied
and connected with all substances； in which they necessarily
receive； according to the Leibnitzian school； their existence and
permanence； consequently also reciprocal correspondence； according
to universal laws。
4th。 This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time； in
which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility； originated in
the same delusion of transcendental reflection。 If I attempt to
represent by the mere understanding； the external relations of things；
I can do so only by employing the conception of their reciprocal
action； and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with
another state； I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause
and effect。 And thus Leibnitz regarded space as a certain order in the
community of substances； and time as the dynamical sequence of their
states。 That which space and time possess proper to themselves and
independent of things； he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our
conceptions of them； whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical
relations is held to be a self…existent intuition； antecedent even
to things themselves。 Thus space and time were the intelligible form
of the connection of things （substances and their states） in
themselves。 But things were intelligible substances （substantiae
noumena）。 At the same time； he made these conceptions valid of
phenomena； because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode
of intuition； but sought all； even the empirical representation of
objects； in the understanding； and left to sense naught but the
despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of
the former。
But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning
things in themselves by means of the pure understanding （which is
impossible）； it could not apply to phenomena； which do not represent
things in themselves。 In such a case I should be obliged in
transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the
conditions of sensibility； and so space and time would not be
determinations of things in themselves； but of phenomena。 What
things may be in themselves； I know not and need not know； because a
thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon。
I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions
of reflection。 Matter is substantia phaenomenon。 That in it which is
internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies；
and in all the functions and operations it performs； and which are
indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense。 I cannot
therefore find anything that is absolutely； but only what is
comparatively internal； and which itself consists of external
relations。 The absolutely internal in matter； and as it should be
according to the pure understanding； is a mere chimera； for matter
is not an o