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if true； must be in agreement with each other （consentientia uni
tertio consentiunt inter se）。 Conviction may； therefore； be
distinguished； from an external point of view； from persuasion； by the
possibility of communicating it and by showing its validity for the
reason of every man； for in this case the presumption； at least；
arises that the agreement of all judgements with each other； in
spite of the different characters of individuals； rests upon the
common ground of the agreement of each with the object； and thus the
correctness of the judgement is established。
Persuasion； accordingly； cannot be subjectively distinguished from
conviction； that is； so long as the subject views its judgement simply
as a phenomenon of its own mind。 But if we inquire whether the grounds
of our judgement； which are valid for us； produce the same effect on
the reason of others as on our own； we have then the means； though
only subjective means； not； indeed； of producing conviction； but of
detecting the merely private validity of the judgement； in other
words； of discovering that there is in it the element of mere
persuasion。
If we can； in addition to this； develop the subjective causes of the
judgement； which we have taken for its objective grounds； and thus
explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind； apart
altogether from the objective character of the object； we can then
expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it； although； if
its subjective cause lies in our nature； we cannot hope altogether
to escape its influence。
I can only maintain； that is； affirm as necessarily valid for
every one； that which produces conviction。 Persuasion I may keep for
myself； if it is agreeable to me； but I cannot； and ought not； to
attempt to impose it as binding upon others。
Holding for true； or the subjective validity of a judgement in
relation to conviction （which is； at the same time； objectively
valid）； has the three following degrees： opinion； belief； and
knowledge。 Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement；
subjectively as well as objectively。 Belief is subjectively
sufficient； but is recognized as being objectively insufficient。
Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient。
Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction （for myself）； objective
sufficiency is termed certainty （for all）。 I need not dwell longer
on the explanation of such simple conceptions。
I must never venture to be of opinion； without knowing something； at
least； by which my judgement； in itself merely problematical； is
brought into connection with the truth… which connection； although not
perfect； is still something more than an arbitrary fiction。
Moreover； the law of such a connection must be certain。 For if； in
relation to this law； I have nothing more than opinion； my judgement
is but a play of the imagination； without the least relation to truth。
In the judgements of pure reason； opinion has no place。 For； as they
do not rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is
that of necessary truth and a priori cognition； the principle of
connection in it requires universality and necessity； and consequently
perfect certainty… otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at
all。 Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics； we
must know； or abstain from forming a judgement altogether。 The case is
the same with the maxims of morality。 For we must not hazard an action
on the mere opinion that it is allowed； but we must know it to be so。
In the transcendental sphere of reason； on the other hand； the
term opinion is too weak； while the word knowledge is too strong。 From
the merely speculative point of view； therefore； we cannot form a
judgement at all。 For the subjective grounds of a judgement； such as
produce belief； cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries；
inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support and are
incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure。
But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically
insufficient judgement can be termed belief。 Now the practical
reference is either to skill or to morality； to the former； when the
end proposed is arbitrary and accidental； to the latter； when it is
absolutely necessary。
If we propose to ourselves any end whatever； the conditions of its
attainment are hypothetically necessary。 The necessity is
subjectively； but still only comparatively； sufficient； if I am
acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be
attained。 On the other hand； it is sufficient； absolutely and for
every one； if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with
any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end
would be possible。 In the former case my supposition… my judgement
with regard to certain conditions… is a merely accidental belief； in
the latter it is a necessary belief。 The physician must pursue some
course in the case of a patient who is in danger； but is ignorant of
the nature of the disease。 He observes the symptoms； and concludes；
according to the best of his judgement； that it is a case of phthisis。
His belief is； even in his own judgement； only contingent： another man
might； perhaps come nearer the truth。 Such a belief； contingent
indeed； but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for
the attainment of certain ends； I term Pragmatical belief。
The usual test； whether that which any one maintains is merely his
persuasion； or his subjective conviction at least； that is； his firm
belief； is a bet。 It frequently happens that a man delivers his
opinions with so much boldness and assurance； that he appears to be
under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error。 The
offer of a bet startles him； and makes him pause。 Sometimes it turns
out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat； but not at ten。
For he does not hesitate； perhaps； to venture a ducat； but if it is
proposed to stake ten； he immediately becomes aware of the possibility
of his being mistaken… a possibility which has hitherto escaped his
observation。 If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the
happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition； our
judgement drops its air of triumph； we take the alarm； and discover
the actual strength of our belief。 Thus pragmatical belief has
degrees； varying in proportion to the interests at stake。
Now； in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in
reference to some object； and where； accordingly； our judgement is
purely theoretical； we can still represent to ourselves； in thought；
the possibility of a course of action； for which we suppose that we
have sufficient grounds； if any means existed of ascertaining the
truth of the matter。 Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements
an analogon of practical judgements； to which the word belief may
properly be applied； and which we may term doctrinal belief。 I
should not h