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has any truth or reference to any possible object； we must admit
that its law must be valid； not merely for men but for all rational
creatures generally； not merely under certain contingent conditions or
with exceptions but with absolute necessity； then it is clear that
no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such
apodeictic laws。 For with what right could we bring into unbounded
respect as a universal precept for every rational nature that which
perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity？ Or how
could laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the
determination of the will of rational beings generally； and for us
only as such； if they were merely empirical and did not take their
origin wholly a priori from pure but practical reason？
Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should
wish to derive it from examples。 For every example of it that is set
before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality；
whether it is worthy to serve as an original example； i。e。； as a
pattern； but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the conception
of morality。 Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared
with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise Him as
such； and so He says of Himself； 〃Why call ye Me （whom you see）
good； none is good （the model of good） but God only （whom ye do not
see）？〃 But whence have we the conception of God as the supreme good？
Simply from the idea of moral perfection； which reason frames a priori
and connects inseparably with the notion of a free will。 Imitation
finds no place at all in morality； and examples serve only for
encouragement； i。e。； they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the
law commands； they make visible that which the practical rule
expresses more generally； but they can never authorize us to set aside
the true original which lies in reason and to guide ourselves by
examples。
If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what
must rest simply on pure reason； independent of all experience； I
think it is not necessary even to put the question whether it is
good to exhibit these concepts in their generality （in abstracto） as
they are established a priori along with the principles belonging to
them； if our knowledge is to be distinguished from the vulgar and to
be called philosophical。
In our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary； for if we
collected votes whether pure rational knowledge separated from
everything empirical； that is to say； metaphysic of morals； or whether
popular practical philosophy is to be preferred； it is easy to guess
which side would preponderate。
This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable； if
the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place
and been satisfactorily accomplished。 This implies that we first found
ethics on metaphysics； and then； when it is firmly established；
procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character。 But it is
quite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry； on which the
soundness of the principles depends。 It is not only that this
proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true
philosophical popularity； since there is no art in being
intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight； but also it
produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and
half…reasoned principles。 Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be
used for every…day chat； but the sagacious find in it only
confusion； and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves； they
turn away their eyes； while philosophers； who see quite well through
this delusion； are little listened to when they call men off for a
time from this pretended popularity； in order that they might be
rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight。
We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite
fashion； and we shall find at one time the special constitution of
human nature （including； however； the idea of a rational nature
generally）； at one time perfection； at another happiness； here moral
sense； there fear of God。 a little of this； and a little of that； in
marvellous mixture； without its occurring to them to ask whether the
principles of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human
nature at all （which we can have only from experience）； or； if this is
not so； if these principles are to be found altogether a priori；
free from everything empirical； in pure rational concepts only and
nowhere else； not even in the smallest degree； then rather to adopt
the method of making this a separate inquiry； as pure practical
philosophy； or （if one may use a name so decried） as metaphysic of
morals；* to bring it by itself to completeness； and to require the
public； which wishes for popular treatment； to await the issue of this
undertaking。
*Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied； pure logic
from applied； so if we choose we may also distinguish pure
philosophy of morals （metaphysic） from applied （viz。； applied to human
nature）。 By this designation we are also at once reminded that moral
principles are not based on properties of human nature； but must
subsist a priori of themselves； while from such principles practical
rules must be capable of being deduced for every rational nature；
and accordingly for that of man。
Such a metaphysic of morals； completely isolated； not mixed with any
anthropology； theology； physics； or hyperphysics； and still less
with occult qualities （which we might call hypophysical）； is not
only an indispensable substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge of
duties； but is at the same time a desideratum of the highest
importance to the actual fulfilment of their precepts。 For the pure
conception of duty； unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical
attractions； and； in a word； the conception of the moral law；
exercises on the human heart； by way of reason alone （which first
becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical）； an
influence so much more powerful than all other springs* which may be
derived from the field of experience； that； in the consciousness of
its worth； it despises the latter； and can by degrees become their
master； whereas a mixed ethics； compounded partly of motives drawn
from feelings and inclinations； and partly also of conceptions of
reason； must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be
brought under any principle； which lead to good only by mere
accident and very often also to evil。
*I have a letter from the late excellent Sulzer； in which he asks me
what can be the reason that moral instruction； although containing
much that is convincing for the reason； yet accomplishes so little？ My
answer was postponed in order that I might make it complete。 But it is
simply this： that the teachers themselves have not got their own
notions clear； and when the