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determine the will； even without paying any regard to the effect
expected from it； in order that this will may be called good
absolutely and without qualification？ As I have deprived the will of
every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law； there
remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law
in general； which alone is to serve the will as a principle； i。e。； I
am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law。 Here； now； it is the simple
conformity to law in general； without assuming any particular law
applicable to certain actions； that serves the will as its principle
and must so serve it； if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a
chimerical notion。 The common reason of men in its practical
judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the
principle here suggested。 Let the question be； for example： May I when
in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it？ I
readily distinguish here between the two significations which the
question may have： Whether it is prudent； or whether it is right； to
make a false promise？ The former may undoubtedly of be the case。 I see
clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a
present difficulty by means of this subterfuge； but it must be well
considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much
greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself； and
as； with all my supposed cunning； the consequences cannot be so easily
foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me
than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present； it should be
considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein
according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise
nothing except with the intention of keeping it。 But it is soon
clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear
of consequences。 Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful
from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences。 In
the first case； the very notion of the action already implies a law
for me； in the second case； I must first look about elsewhere to see
what results may be combined with it which would affect myself。 For to
deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked； but
to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very
advantageous to me； although to abide by it is certainly safer。 The
shortest way； however； and an unerring one； to discover the answer
to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty； is
to ask myself； 〃Should I be content that my maxim （to extricate myself
from difficulty by a false promise） should hold good as a universal
law； for myself as well as for others？ and should I be able to say
to myself； 〃Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds
himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate
himself？〃 Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie；
I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law。 For
with such a law there would be no promises at all； since it would be
in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those
who would not believe this allegation； or if they over hastily did
so would pay me back in my own coin。 Hence my maxim； as soon as it
should be made a universal law； would necessarily destroy itself。
I do not； therefore； need any far…reaching penetration to discern
what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good。
Inexperienced in the course of the world； incapable of being
prepared for all its contingencies； I only ask myself： Canst thou also
will that thy maxim should be a universal law？ If not； then it must be
rejected； and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to
myself or even to others； but because it cannot enter as a principle
into a possible universal legislation； and reason extorts from me
immediate respect for such legislation。 I do not indeed as yet discern
on what this respect is based （this the philosopher may inquire）；
but at least I understand this； that it is an estimation of the
worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by
inclination； and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for
the practical law is what constitutes duty； to which every other
motive must give place； because it is the condition of a will being
good in itself； and the worth of such a will is above everything。
Thus； then； without quitting the moral knowledge of common human
reason； we have arrived at its principle。 And although； no doubt；
common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal
form； yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as
the standard of their decision。 Here it would be easy to show how；
with this compass in hand； men are well able to distinguish； in
every case that occurs； what is good； what bad； conformably to duty or
inconsistent with it； if； without in the least teaching them
anything new； we only； like Socrates； direct their attention to the
principle they themselves employ； and that； therefore； we do not
need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and
good； yea； even wise and virtuous。 Indeed we might well have
conjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound
to do； and therefore also to know； would be within the reach of
every man； even the commonest。 Here we cannot forbear admiration
when we see how great an advantage the practical judgement has over
the theoretical in the common understanding of men。 In the latter；
if common reason ventures to depart from the laws of experience and
from the perceptions of the senses； it falls into mere
inconceivabilities and self…contradictions； at least into a chaos of
uncertainty； obscurity； and instability。 But in the practical sphere
it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs
from practical laws that its power of judgement begins to show
itself to advantage。 It then becomes even subtle； whether it be that
it chicanes with its own conscience or with other claims respecting
what is to be called right； or whether it desires for its own
instruction to determine honestly the worth of actions； and； in the
latter case； it may even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as
any philosopher whatever can promise himself。 Nay； it is almost more
sure of doing so； because the philosopher cannot have any other
principle； while he may easily perplex his judgement by a multitude of
considerations foreign to the matter； and so turn aside from the right
way。 Would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in
the judgement of common reason； or at most only to call in
philosophy for the purpose of rendering the system of morals more
complete and intelligible； and its rules more convenient for use
（especially for disputation）； but not so as to draw off the common
understan