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therefore； admitting that nature generally in the distribution of
her capacities has adapted the means to the end； its true
destination must be to produce a will； not merely good as a means to
something else； but good in itself； for which reason was absolutely
necessary。 This will then； though not indeed the sole and complete
good； must be the supreme good and the condition of every other；
even of the desire of happiness。 Under these circumstances； there is
nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the
cultivation of the reason； which is requisite for the first and
unconditional purpose； does in many ways interfere； at least in this
life； with the attainment of the second； which is always
conditional； namely； happiness。 Nay； it may even reduce it to nothing；
without nature thereby failing of her purpose。 For reason recognizes
the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination；
and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its
own proper kind； namely that from the attainment of an end； which
end again is determined by reason only； notwithstanding that this
may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination。
We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be
highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything
further； a notion which exists already in the sound natural
understanding； requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught；
and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the
first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest。 In order to
do this； we will take the notion of duty； which includes that of a
good will； although implying certain subjective restrictions and
hindrances。 These； however； far from concealing it； or rendering it
unrecognizable； rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine
forth so much the brighter。
I omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent
with duty； although they may be useful for this or that purpose； for
with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise
at all； since they even conflict with it。 I also set aside those
actions which really conform to duty； but to which men have no
direct inclination； performing them because they are impelled
thereto by some other inclination。 For in this case we can readily
distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from
duty； or from a selfish view。 It is much harder to make this
distinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has
besides a direct inclination to it。 For example； it is always a matter
of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced
purchaser； and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman
does not overcharge； but keeps a fixed price for everyone； so that a
child buys of him as well as any other。 Men are thus honestly
served； but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman
has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty： his own
advantage required it； it is out of the question in this case to
suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of
the buyers； so that； as it were； from love he should give no advantage
to one over another。 Accordingly the action was done neither from duty
nor from direct inclination； but merely with a selfish view。
On the other hand； it is a duty to maintain one's life； and； in
addition； everyone has also a direct inclination to do so。 But on this
account the of anxious care which most men take for it has no
intrinsic worth； and their maxim has no moral import。 They preserve
their life as duty requires； no doubt； but not because duty
requires。 On the other band； if adversity and hopeless sorrow have
completely taken away the relish for life； if the unfortunate one；
strong in mind； indignant at his fate rather than desponding or
dejected； wishes for death； and yet preserves his life without
loving it… not from inclination or fear； but from duty… then his maxim
has a moral worth。
To be beneficent when we can is a duty； and besides this； there
are many minds so sympathetically constituted that； without any
other motive of vanity or self…interest； they find a pleasure in
spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction
of others so far as it is their own work。 But I maintain that in
such a case an action of this kind； however proper； however amiable it
may be； bas nevertheless no true moral worth； but is on a level with
other inclinations； e。g。； the inclination to honour； which； if it is
happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and
accordant with duty and consequently honourable； deserves praise and
encouragement； but not esteem。 For the maxim lacks the moral import；
namely； that such actions be done from duty； not from inclination。 Put
the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow
of his own； extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others； and
that； while he still has the power to benefit others in distress； he
is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own；
and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead
insensibility； and performs the action without any inclination to
it； but simply from duty； then first has his action its genuine
moral worth。 Further still； if nature bas put little sympathy in the
heart of this or that man； if he； supposed to be an upright man； is by
temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others；
perhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the
special gift of patience and fortitude and supposes； or even requires；
that others should have the same… and such a man would certainly not
be the meanest product of nature… but if nature had not specially
framed him for a philanthropist； would he not still find in himself
a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a
good…natured temperament could be？ Unquestionably。 It is just in
this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is
incomparably the highest of all； namely； that he is beneficent； not
from inclination； but from duty。
To secure one's own happiness is a duty； at least indirectly； for
discontent with one's condition； under a pressure of many anxieties
and amidst unsatisfied wants； might easily become a great temptation
to transgression of duty。 But here again； without looking to duty； all
men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to
happiness； because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are
combined in one total。 But the precept of happiness is often of such a
sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations； and yet a
man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of
satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness。 It is not
then to be wondered at that a single inclination； definite both as
to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be
gra