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the moral law which we before presupposed （when by the idea of freedom
we detach ourselves from every empirical interest）； but that we
ought to detach ourselves from these interests； i。e。； to consider
ourselves as free in action and yet as subject to certain laws； so
as to find a worth simply in our own person which can compensate us
for the loss of everything that gives worth to our condition； this
we are not yet able to discern in this way； nor do we see how it is
possible so to act… in other words； whence the moral law derives its
obligation。
It must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle here
from which it seems impossible to escape。 In the order of efficient
causes we assume ourselves free； in order that in the order of ends we
may conceive ourselves as subject to moral laws： and we afterwards
conceive ourselves as subject to these laws； because we have
attributed to ourselves freedom of will： for freedom and
self…legislation of will are both autonomy and； therefore； are
reciprocal conceptions； and for this very reason one must not be
used to explain the other or give the reason of it； but at most only
logical purposes to reduce apparently different notions of the same
object to one single concept （as we reduce different fractions of
the same value to the lowest terms）。
One resource remains to us； namely； to inquire whether we do not
occupy different points of view when by means of freedom we think
ourselves as causes efficient a priori； and when we form our
conception of ourselves from our actions as effects which we see
before our eyes。
It is a remark which needs no subtle reflection to make； but which
we may assume that even the commonest understanding can make； although
it be after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judgement which
it calls feeling； that all the 〃ideas〃 that come to us involuntarily
（as those of the senses） do not enable us to know objects otherwise
than as they affect us； so that what they may be in themselves remains
unknown to us； and consequently that as regards 〃ideas〃 of this kind
even with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding
can apply to them； we can by them only attain to the knowledge of
appearances； never to that of things in themselves。 As soon as this
distinction has once been made （perhaps merely in consequence of the
difference observed between the ideas given us from without； and in
which we are passive； and those that we produce simply from ourselves；
and in which we show our own activity）； then it follows of itself that
we must admit and assume behind the appearance something else that
is not an appearance； namely； the things in themselves； although we
must admit that as they can never be known to us except as they affect
us； we can come no nearer to them； nor can we ever know what they
are in themselves。 This must furnish a distinction； however crude；
between a world of sense and the world of understanding； of which
the former may be different according to the difference of the
sensuous impressions in various observers； while the second which is
its basis always remains the same； Even as to himself； a man cannot
pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by
internal sensation。 For as he does not as it were create himself；
and does not come by the conception of himself a priori but
empirically； it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge
even of himself only by the inner sense and； consequently； only
through the appearances of his nature and the way in which his
consciousness is affected。 At the same time beyond these
characteristics of his own subject； made up of mere appearances； he
must necessarily suppose something else as their basis； namely； his
ego； whatever its characteristics in itself may be。 Thus in respect to
mere perception and receptivity of sensations he must reckon himself
as belonging to the world of sense； but in respect of whatever there
may be of pure activity in him （that which reaches consciousness
immediately and not through affecting the senses）； he must reckon
himself as belonging to the intellectual world； of which； however；
he has no further knowledge。 To such a conclusion the reflecting man
must come with respect to all the things which can be presented to
him： it is probably to be met with even in persons of the commonest
understanding； who； as is well known； are very much inclined to
suppose behind the objects of the senses something else invisible
and acting of itself。 They spoil it； however； by presently
sensualizing this invisible again； that is to say； wanting to make
it an object of intuition； so that they do not become a whit the
wiser。
Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he
distinguishes himself from everything else； even from himself as
affected by objects； and that is reason。 This being pure spontaneity
is even elevated above the understanding。 For although the latter is a
spontaneity and does not； like sense； merely contain intuitions that
arise when we are affected by things （and are therefore passive）；
yet it cannot produce from its activity any other conceptions than
those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense under
rules and； thereby； to unite them in one consciousness； and without
this use of the sensibility it could not think at all； whereas； on the
contrary； reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I
call ideas ＇ideal conceptions＇ that it thereby far transcends
everything that the sensibility can give it； and exhibits its most
important function in distinguishing the world of sense from that of
understanding； and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding
itself。
For this reason a rational being must regard himself qua
intelligence （not from the side of his lower faculties） as belonging
not to the world of sense； but to that of understanding； hence he
has two points of view from which he can regard himself； and recognise
laws of the exercise of his faculties； and consequently of all his
actions： first； so far as he belongs to the world of sense； he finds
himself subject to laws of nature （heteronomy）； secondly； as belonging
to the intelligible world； under laws which being independent of
nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone。
As a rational being； and consequently belonging to the
intelligible world； man can never conceive the causality of his own
will otherwise than on condition of the idea of freedom； for
independence of the determinate causes of the sensible world （an
independence which reason must always ascribe to itself） is freedom。
Now the idea of freedom is inseparably connected with the conception
of autonomy； and this again with the universal principle of morality
which is ideally the foundation of all actions of rational beings；
just as the law of nature is of all phenomena。
Now the suspicion is removed which we raised above； that there was a
latent