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that of morality； and our explanation would thus be involved in a
gross circle； and； in the next place； if we avoid this； the only
notion of the Divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of
the attributes of desire of glory and dominion； combined with the
awful conceptions of might and vengeance； and any system of morals
erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality。
However； if I had to choose between the notion of the moral sense
and that of perfection in general （two systems which at least do not
weaken morality； although they are totally incapable of serving as its
foundation）； then I should decide for the latter； because it at
least withdraws the decision of the question from the sensibility
and brings it to the court of pure reason； and although even here it
decides nothing； it at all events preserves the indefinite idea （of
a will good in itself free from corruption； until it shall be more
precisely defined。
For the rest I think I may be excused here from a detailed
refutation of all these doctrines； that would only be superfluous
labour； since it is so easy； and is probably so well seen even by
those whose office requires them to decide for one of these theories
（because their hearers would not tolerate suspension of judgement）。
But what interests us more here is to know that the prime foundation
of morality laid down by all these principles is nothing but
heteronomy of the will； and for this reason they must necessarily miss
their aim。
In every case where an object of the will has to be supposed； in
order that the rule may be prescribed which is to determine the
will； there the rule is simply heteronomy； the imperative is
conditional； namely； if or because one wishes for this object； one
should act so and so： hence it can never command morally； that is；
categorically。 Whether the object determines the will by means of
inclination； as in the principle of private happiness； or by means
of reason directed to objects of our possible volition generally； as
in the principle of perfection； in either case the will never
determines itself immediately by the conception of the action； but
only by the influence which the foreseen effect of the action has on
the will； I ought to do something； on this account； because I wish for
something else； and here there must be yet another law assumed in me
as its subject； by which I necessarily will this other thing； and this
law again requires an imperative to restrict this maxim。 For the
influence which the conception of an object within the reach of our
faculties can exercise on the will of the subject； in consequence of
its natural properties； depends on the nature of the subject； either
the sensibility （inclination and taste）； or the understanding and
reason； the employment of which is by the peculiar constitution of
their nature attended with satisfaction。 It follows that the law would
be； properly speaking； given by nature； and； as such； it must be known
and proved by experience and would consequently be contingent and
therefore incapable of being an apodeictic practical rule； such as the
moral rule must be。 Not only so； but it is inevitably only heteronomy；
the will does not give itself the law； but is given by a foreign
impulse by means of a particular natural constitution of the subject
adapted to receive it。 An absolutely good will； then； the principle of
which must be a categorical imperative； will be indeterminate as
regards all objects and will contain merely the form of volition
generally； and that as autonomy； that is to say； the capability of the
maxims of every good will to make themselves a universal law； is
itself the only law which the will of every rational being imposes
on itself； without needing to assume any spring or interest as a
foundation。
How such a synthetical practical a priori proposition is possible；
and why it is necessary； is a problem whose solution does not lie
within the bounds of the metaphysic of morals； and we have not here
affirmed its truth； much less professed to have a proof of it in our
power。 We simply showed by the development of the universally received
notion of morality that an autonomy of the will is inevitably
connected with it； or rather is its foundation。 Whoever then holds
morality to be anything real； and not a chimerical idea without any
truth； must likewise admit the principle of it that is here
assigned。 This section then； like the first； was merely analytical。
Now to prove that morality is no creation of the brain； which it
cannot be if the categorical imperative and with it the autonomy of
the will is true； and as an a priori principle absolutely necessary；
this supposes the possibility of a synthetic use of pure practical
reason； which however we cannot venture on without first giving a
critical examination of this faculty of reason。 In the concluding
section we shall give the principal outlines of this critical
examination as far as is sufficient for our purpose。
THIRD SECTION
TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS TO THE
CRITIQUE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON
The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of
the Will
The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far
as they are rational； and freedom would be this property of such
causality that it can be efficient； independently of foreign causes
determining it； just as physical necessity is the property that the
causality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity
by the influence of foreign causes。
The preceding definition of freedom is negative and therefore
unfruitful for the discovery of its essence； but it leads to a
positive conception which is so much the more full and fruitful。
Since the conception of causality involves that of laws； according
to which； by something that we call cause； something else； namely
the effect； must be produced； hence； although freedom is not a
property of the will depending on physical laws； yet it is not for
that reason lawless； on the contrary it must be a causality acting
according to immutable laws； but of a peculiar kind； otherwise a
free will would be an absurdity。 Physical necessity is a heteronomy of
the efficient causes； for every effect is possible only according to
this law； that something else determines the efficient cause to
exert its causality。 What else then can freedom of the will be but
autonomy； that is； the property of the will to be a law to itself？ But
the proposition： 〃The will is in every action a law to itself；〃 only
expresses the principle： 〃To act on no other maxim than that which can
also have as an object itself as a universal law。〃 Now this is
precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the
principle of morality； so that a free will and a will subject to moral
laws are one and the same。
On the hypothesis； then； of freedom of the will