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law； without any other spring of action； although it may appear to
be so。 For it is always possible that fear of disgrace； perhaps also
obscure dread of other dangers； may have a secret influence on the
will。 Who can prove by experience the non…existence of a cause when
all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it？ But in
such a case the so…called moral imperative； which as such appears to
be categorical and unconditional； would in reality be only a pragmatic
precept； drawing our attention to our own interests and merely
teaching us to take these into consideration。
We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a
categorical imperative； as we have not in this case the advantage of
its reality being given in experience； so that ＇the elucidation of＇
its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation； not
for its establishment。 In the meantime it may be discerned
beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of
a practical law； all the rest may indeed be called principles of the
will but not laws； since whatever is only necessary for the attainment
of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent；
and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the
purpose； on the contrary； the unconditional command leaves the will no
liberty to choose the opposite； consequently it alone carries with
it that necessity which we require in a law。
Secondly； in the case of this categorical imperative or law of
morality； the difficulty （of discerning its possibility） is a very
profound one。 It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition；*
and as there is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of
speculative propositions of this kind； it may readily be supposed that
the difficulty will be no less with the practical。
*I connect the act with the will without presupposing any
condition resulting from any inclination； but a priori； and
therefore necessarily （though only objectively； i。e。； assuming the
idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives）。
This is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce
the willing of an action by mere analysis from another already
presupposed （for we have not such a perfect will）； but connects it
immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being； as
something not contained in it。
In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of
a categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the
formula of it； containing the proposition which alone can be a
categorical imperative； for even if we know the tenor of such an
absolute command； yet how it is possible will require further
special and laborious study； which we postpone to the last section。
When I conceive a hypothetical imperative； in general I do not
know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition。
But when I conceive a categorical imperative； I know at once what it
contains。 For as the imperative contains besides the law only the
necessity that the maxims* shall conform to this law； while the law
contains no conditions restricting it； there remains nothing but the
general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a
universal law； and it is this conformity alone that the imperative
properly represents as necessary。
*A maxim is a subjective principle of action； and must be
distinguished from the objective principle； namely； practical law。 The
former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the
conditions of the subject （often its ignorance or its inclinations）；
so that it is the principle on which the subject acts； but the law
is the objective principle valid for every rational being； and is
the principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative。
There is therefore but one categorical imperative； namely； this： Act
only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
should become a universal law。
Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one
imperative as from their principle； then； although it should remain
undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion； yet at
least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what
this notion means。
Since the universality of the law according to which effects are
produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most
general sense （as to form）； that is the existence of things so far
as it is determined by general laws； the imperative of duty may be
expressed thus： Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by
thy will a universal law of nature。
We will now enumerate a few duties； adopting the usual division of
them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others； and into
perfect and imperfect duties。*
*It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for a
future metaphysic of morals； so that I give it here only as an
arbitrary one （in order to arrange my examples）。 For the rest； I
understand by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favour of
inclination and then I have not merely external but also internal
perfect duties。 This is contrary to the use of the word adopted in the
schools； but I do not intend to justify there； as it is all one for my
purpose whether it is admitted or not。
1。 A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied
of life； but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can
ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to
take his own life。 Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action
could become a universal law of nature。 His maxim is： 〃From
self…love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer
duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction。〃 It is
asked then simply whether this principle founded on self…love can
become a universal law of nature。 Now we see at once that a system
of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of
the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the
improvement of life would contradict itself and； therefore； could
not exist as a system of nature； hence that maxim cannot possibly
exist as a universal law of nature and； consequently； would be
wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty。
2。 Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money。 He
knows that he will not be able to repay it； but sees also that nothing
will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a
definite time。 He desires to make this promise； but he has still so
much conscience as to ask himself： 〃Is it not unlawful and
inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way？〃
Suppose however that he resolves to do so： then the maxim of his
action would be expressed thus： 〃When I think myself in want of money；
I will borrow money and promise to repay it； although I know that I
never can do so。