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occupation being with the synthesis of that which is given。
Moreover； the poverty of the usual arguments which go to prove the
existence of a vast sphere of possibility； of which all that is real
（every object of experience） is but a small part； is very
remarkable。 〃All real is possible〃； from this follows naturally；
according to the logical laws of conversion； the particular
proposition： 〃Some possible is real。〃 Now this seems to be
equivalent to： 〃Much is possible that is not real。〃 No doubt it does
seem as if we ought to consider the sum of the possible to be
greater than that of the real； from the fact that something must be
added to the former to constitute the latter。 But this notion of
adding to the possible is absurd。 For that which is not in the sum
of the possible； and consequently requires to be added to it； is
manifestly impossible。 In addition to accordance with the formal
conditions of experience； the understanding requires a connection with
some perception； but that which is connected with this perception is
real； even although it is not immediately perceived。 But that
another series of phenomena； in plete coherence with that which
is given in perception； consequently more than one all…embracing
experience is possible； is an inference which cannot be concluded from
the data given us by experience； and still less without any data at
all。 That which is possible only under conditions which are themselves
merely possible； is not possible in any respect。 And yet we can find
no more certain ground on which to base the discussion of the question
whether the sphere of possibility is wider than that of experience。
I have merely mentioned these questions； that in treating of the
conception of the understanding； there might be no omission of
anything that； in the mon opinion； belongs to them。 In reality；
however； the notion of absolute possibility （possibility which is
valid in every respect） is not a mere conception of the understanding；
which can be employed empirically； but belongs to reason alone；
which passes the bounds of all empirical use of the understanding。
We have； therefore； contented ourselves with a merely critical remark；
leaving the subject to be explained in the sequel。
Before concluding this fourth section； and at the same time the
system of all principles of the pure understanding； it seems proper to
mention the reasons which induced me to term the principles of
modality postulates。 This expression I do not here use in the sense
which some more recent philosophers； contrary to its meaning with
mathematicians； to whom the word properly belongs； attach to it…
that of a proposition； namely； immediately certain； requiring
neither deduction nor proof。 For if； in the case of synthetical
propositions； however evident they may be； we accord to them without
deduction； and merely on the strength of their own pretensions；
unqualified belief； all critique of the understanding is entirely
lost； and； as there is no want of bold pretensions； which the mon
belief （though for the philosopher this is no credential） does not
reject； the understanding lies exposed to every delusion and
conceit； without the power of refusing its assent to those assertions；
which； though illegitimate； demand acceptance as veritable axioms。
When； therefore； to the conception of a thing an a priori
determination is synthetically added； such a proposition must
obtain； if not a proof； at least a deduction of the legitimacy of
its assertion。
The principles of modality are； however； not objectively
synthetical； for the predicates of possibility； reality； and necessity
do not in the least augment the conception of that of which they are
affirmed； inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of
the object。 But as they are； nevertheless； always synthetical； they
are so merely subjectively。 That is to say； they have a reflective
power； and apply to the conception of a thing； of which； in other
respects； they affirm nothing； the faculty of cognition in which the
conception originates and has its seat。 So that if the conception
merely agree with the formal conditions of experience； its object is
called possible； if it is in connection with perception； and
determined thereby； the object is real； if it is determined
according to conceptions by means of the connection of perceptions；
the object is called necessary。 The principles of modality therefore
predicate of a conception nothing more than the procedure of the
faculty of cognition which generated it。 Now a postulate in
mathematics is a practical proposition which contains nothing but
the synthesis by which we present an object to ourselves； and
produce the conception of it； for example… 〃With a given line； to
describe a circle upon a plane； from a given point〃； and such a
proposition does not admit of proof； because the procedure； which it
requires； is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate
the conception of such a figure。 With the same right； accordingly； can
we postulate the principles of modality； because they do not
augment* the conception of a thing but merely indicate the manner in
which it is connected with the faculty of cognition。
*When I think the reality of a thing； I do really think more than
the possibility； but not in the thing； for that can never contain more
in reality than was contained in its plete possibility。 But while
the notion of possibility is merely the notion of a position of
thing in relation to the understanding （its empirical use）； reality is
the conjunction of the thing with perception。
GENERAL REMARK ON THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES。
It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a
thing from the category alone； but must always have an intuition； by
which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception
of the understanding。 Take； for example； the categories of relation。
How （1） a thing can exist only as a subject； and not as a mere
determination of other things； that is； can be substance； or how
（2）； because something exists； some other thing must exist；
consequently how a thing can be a cause； or how （3）； when several
things exist； from the fact that one of these things exists； some
consequence to the others follows； and reciprocally； and in this way a
munity of substances can be possible… are questions whose
solution cannot be obtained from mere conceptions。 The very same is
the case with the other categories； for example； how a thing can be of
the same sort with many others； that is； can be a quantity； and so on。
So long as we have not intuition we cannot know whether we do really
think an object by the categories； and where an object can anywhere be
found to cohere with them； and thus the truth is established； that the
categories are not in themselves cognitions； but mere forms of thought
for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions。 For the same
reason is it true that from categories alone no synthetical
proposition can be made。 For example： 〃In every existence there is
substance；〃 that is； something that can exist only as a subject and
not as mere predicate； or； 〃Everyth