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our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our
sensuous cognition in general。 We have intended； then； to say that all
our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena； that the
things which we intuite； are not in themselves the same as our
representations of them in intuition； nor are their relations in
themselves so constituted as they appear to us； and that if we take
away the subject； or even only the subjective constitution of our
senses in general； then not only the nature and relations of objects
in space and time； but even space and time themselves disappear； and
that these； as phenomena； cannot exist in themselves； but only in
us。 What may be the nature of objects considered as things in
themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility
is quite unknown to us。 We know nothing more than our mode of
perceiving them； which is peculiar to us； and which； though not of
necessity pertaining to every animated being； is so to the whole human
race。 With this alone we have to do。 Space and time are the pure forms
thereof； sensation the matter。 The former alone can we cognize a
priori； that is； antecedent to all actual perception； and for this
reason such cognition is called pure intuition。 The latter is that
in our cognition which is called cognition a posteriori； that is；
empirical intuition。 The former appertain absolutely and necessarily
to our sensibility； of whatsoever kind our sensations may be； the
latter may be of very diversified character。 Supposing that we
should carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest degree
of clearness； we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a
knowledge of the constitution of objects as things in themselves。
For we could only； at best； arrive at a plete cognition of our
own mode of intuition； that is of our sensibility； and this always
under the conditions originally attaching to the subject； namely；
the conditions of space and time； while the question： 〃What are
objects considered as things in themselves？〃 remains unanswerable even
after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world。
To say； then； that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused
representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs
to them as things in themselves； and this under an accumulation of
characteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot
distinguish in consciousness； is a falsification of the conception
of sensibility and phenomenization； which renders our whole doctrine
thereof empty and useless。 The difference between a confused and a
clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with
content。 No doubt the conception of right； as employed by a sound
understanding； contains all that the most subtle investigation could
unfold from it； although； in the ordinary practical use of the word；
we are not conscious of the manifold representations prised in
the conception。 But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary
conception is a sensuous one； containing a mere phenomenon； for
right cannot appear as a phenomenon； but the conception of it lies
in the understanding； and represents a property （the moral property）
of actions； which belongs to them in themselves。 On the other hand；
the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could
belong to an object considered as a thing in itself； but merely the
phenomenon or appearance of something； and the mode in which we are
affected by that appearance； and this receptivity of our faculty of
cognition is called sensibility； and remains toto caelo different from
the cognition of an object in itself； even though we should examine
the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom。
It must be admitted that the Leibnitz…Wolfian philosophy has
assigned an entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations
into the nature and origin of our cognitions； inasmuch as it regards
the distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely
logical； whereas it is plainly transcendental； and concerns not merely
the clearness or obscurity； but the content and origin of both。 For
the faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an
indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in
themselves； but； in fact； gives us no knowledge of these at all。 On
the contrary； so soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective
nature； the object represented； with the properties ascribed to it
by sensuous intuition； entirely disappears； because it was only this
subjective nature that determined the form of the object as a
phenomenon。
In phenomena； we monly； indeed； distinguish that which
essentially belongs to the intuition of them； and is valid for the
sensuous faculty of every human being； from that which belongs to
the same intuition accidentally； as valid not for the sensuous faculty
in general； but for a particular state or organization of this or that
sense。 Accordingly； we are accustomed to say that the former is a
cognition which represents the object itself； whilst the latter
presents only a particular appearance or phenomenon thereof。 This
distinction； however； is only empirical。 If we stop here （as is
usual）； and do not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere
phenomenon （as we ought to do）； in which nothing that can appertain to
a thing in itself is to be found； our transcendental distinction is
lost； and we believe that we cognize objects as things in
themselves； although in the whole range of the sensuous world；
investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may； we have
to do with nothing but phenomena。 Thus； we call the rainbow a mere
appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower； and the rain； the
reality or thing in itself； and this is right enough； if we understand
the latter conception in a merely physical sense； that is； as that
which in universal experience； and under whatever conditions of
sensuous perception； is known in intuition to be so and so determined；
and not otherwise。 But if we consider this empirical datum
generally； and inquire； without reference to its accordance with all
our senses； whether there can be discovered in it aught which
represents an object as a thing in itself （the raindrops of course are
not such； for they are； as phenomena； empirical objects）； the question
of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental；
and not only are the raindrops mere phenomena； but even their circular
form； nay； the space itself through which they fall； is nothing in
itself； but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of
our sensuous intuition； whilst the transcendental object remains for
us utterly unknown。
The second important concern of our aesthetic is that it does not
obtain favour merely as a plausible hypothesis； but possess as
undoubted a character of certainty as can be demanded of any theory
which is to serve for an organon。 In order fully to convince the
reader of this certainty； we shall select a case which will serve to
make its validity apparent； and also to illustrate what has been
said in SS 3。
Suppose； then； that space and time are in th